Don Draper’s Last Betrayal

Photo by Frank Ockenfels 3/AMC

After several days of meditation in a Left Coast commune, I’m finally ready to face the truth: , which ended its long run on AMC last Sunday and which I watched faithfully through all 92 episodes, was a setup for the world’s longest shaggy-dog drama. We poor saps in the grandstands naively assumed that was the consummate soap opera for sophisticates, a steamy excursion through the 1960s and 1970s, a forbidden peek at the dark heart of Madison Avenue advertising—the seven deadly sins in seven seasons.

For the most part, was an enjoyable trip to the New York City of decades past. It was fun to see dial phones, antique business attire, and analog office machines, and to revisit an era where the only fonts available were pica and elite. Executive producer Matthew Weiner worked hard to furnish his sets with chronologically correct art and décor, though he was less successful at vetting the dialogue. Anachronistic language (“No problem,” “I am!”, “I will!”, and the ubiquitous “Fine!”) kept creeping into the scripts. He needed a senior writer in more ways than one.

Nevertheless, we wanted the lurid cabaret to last forever. But as the juicy series drew to a close, the long-awaited finale had everyone wondering. How would Weiner wrap it all up? The endless travails of at least a dozen characters had to be resolved. Weiner wasn’t giving any clues. Worse, he had told his breathless groupies that the ending had been set from the start. We could only guess.

My favorite theory: someone would jump from a corner office and land in the middle of Madison Avenue. But that was favorite theory. Animation behind the opening credits showed a dark figure falling past office-tower windows while the show’s haunting theme song plays. Weiner spiked the suicide theory early on, though. No final leap, he promised. But I suspected a trick. How else could Don Draper, maddest of the Mad Men, find peace, not to mention justice?

A millionaire advertising genius played to soapy perfection by Jon Hamm, Don was clearly due for a comeuppance. He had seduced so many women and wrecked so many lives, including his own—real and secret—that someone would have to pay. Sure enough, in the last two episodes, Don seemed to be tumbling down, heading for that chalk outline on the pavement. His ex-wife Betty was dying of lung cancer, a victim of Madison Avenue tobacco ads created by her husband. Now it was Don’s turn to face the theme music. His ad agency was bought and digested by McCann Erickson, and Don finds himself seated at a table with 20 other faceless advertising gurus, the kind of meeting he has long avoided. He gets up, leaves the room, and drives west, leaving behind a $6 million bonus and a chance to enter advertising paradise—writing copy for Coca-Cola.

On the road to California, Don finds nothing but the retribution he seems to crave. After a squalid encounter in Kansas, he gives away his Cadillac and eventually ends up in a New Age/Zen/Yoga/therapeutic cliffside cult. Bursting into long overdue tears, Don confesses his many sins, which include his young daughter catching him in bed with his neighbor’s wife. There seems to be no way out for Don except to leap into the Pacific. But maybe, as he sits in the lotus position and chants Om, he will find true enlightenment.

Fade to Weiner’s ending. Don’s peaceful visage gives way to the famous 1971 love and harmony Coca-Cola ad, “I’d like to teach the world to sing.” And suddenly the soap opera is over, ending not with a bang but a guffaw. As the scenery collapses, the wires and pulleys backstage are revealed for all to see. On one hand, the denouement was brilliantly funny. On the other, it undercut everything that came before and turned the series into a joke. The last laugh was on us. All that sex, betrayal, greed, deception, ambition, and redemption had only been to set the stage for Don’s return to Madison Avenue. In the end, was really about the creation of a more perfect ad man and a more enlightened way to sell soda.

Still, my hat’s off to Weiner. It takes talent to undo the work of seven years in seven seconds. His ending reminded me of the penultimate episode of , another series to which Weiner applied his creative gifts. After six seasons of watching Tony Soprano struggle through angry sessions with his shrink, we learn that psychotherapy only turns criminals into more effective criminals. Bada-bing!

Though I was disappointed with the finale, I am grateful to Weiner for making it unnecessary to watch reruns. Fool me once. I don’t need to hear ’s final joke—or to see its seven-year setup—again.

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Trash Talk

Photo by Kevin Martini

New York City mayor Bill de Blasio announced this week that his administration has reached agreement on a contract with the Uniformed Sanitationmen’s Association, Local 831. The city’s more than 6,000 uniformed sanitation workers will receive 11 percent raises over the seven-year life of the contract. At Tuesday’s press conference announcing the deal, de Blasio said that the $271.1 million agreement gives sanitation workers “fair wages they deserve and protects New York City taxpayers.”

The sanitation workers have been working without a contract since 2011. Like the deal de Blasio reached with city teachers in 2014, the new agreement provides retroactive raises. “It’s been four long years without a contract,” said Local 831 president Harry Nespoli, who also serves as chair of the Municipal Labor Committee, the umbrella group of nearly 100 unions representing 350,000 city workers. “I just figured it’s time now that these people can get their money to pay some of the bills that they accumulated over the last four years.”

Without naming names, the mayor laid the blame for those contractless years on his predecessor, Michael Bloomberg. “This union, like so many others, went for years without a contract,” de Blasio said. “It just wasn’t fair. It’s not the way people should be treated. We have taken a big step forward today to respect the hard work of the men and women of the sanitation department.” Nespoli agreed: “Don’t forget it started under the old administration, and when Mr. de Blasio came in, we sat down and we talked.”

In their eagerness to congratulate themselves, both men are twisting history. Under New York State law, public-employee unions continue to receive automatic, so-called “step” raises after a contract expires. So Nespoli’s claim that union members have been racking up unpaid bills is a bit of a stretch. Also, knowing that Bloomberg’s third term would be his last, the leaders of the city’s big municipal unions made a strategic bet not to negotiate new contracts. They sensed that the billionaire mayor’s successor would be a progressive Democrat with deep union ties. They were right.

And yet, de Blasio, who rode into office on a wave of union support, has been mayor now for nearly 17 months. The last sanitation contract, negotiated between Bloomberg and Nespoli, took just four months to complete (with a much beefier 17 percent raise for workers). If, as Nespoli suggests, the city’s trash collectors have been suffering, why did it take so long to hammer out the new deal with a friendly mayor?

One culprit might be de Blasio’s constant motion. His first year and a half as mayor has brought a blizzard of new initiatives: universal pre-K, Vision Zero, OneNYC, Housing New York, and so on. He spent the second half of 2014 trying to keep his decaying relationship with the NYPD from turning toxic. Last week, he went to Washington to pitch his Progressive Contract with America to Congress and President Obama. When you’re as busy as de Blasio, it’s helpful to have a unionized city workforce that stays patient, knowing that you will eventually get around to giving them a generous raise for work they’ve already done.

Everyone wants the trash picked up, and no one wants to think much about how it’s done or where it goes. But as a report from the Citizen’s Budget Commission demonstrated last year, New York already has the highest per-ton garbage-collection cost of any large American city. Most of that cost is related to employee compensation. A first-year sanitation worker earns more than $100,000 in total comp, including overtime, holiday pay, and benefits. When the Department of Sanitation announced last year that it would offer its employment exam for the first time in seven years, more than 90,000 people signed up to take it. That’s an awful lot of New Yorkers willing to brave the penury of working without a contract.

City Journal

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The Kickback Kids

Photo by Steve Pope/Getty Images

, by Peter Schweizer (Harper, 256 pp., $27.99)

George Washington Plunkitt, a late- nineteenth-century New York State legislator, made his extra money in a straightforward way. “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em,” he said after people criticized him for patronage, corrupt land sales, and other business-as-usual Tammany Hall goings-on. But Plunkitt distinguished between “honest graft” and the regular kind. It was okay to steal if the stealing was part of a project for the public good—taking a kickback on, say, building a firehouse. By contrast, it wouldn’t be okay to steal at the expense of the public—say, taking a bribe from someone selling poisonous medicine. Bill and Hillary Clinton are good students of Plunkitt’s first lesson, according to Peter Schweizer’s new bestseller, . Since Bill left the presidency, the Clintons seen a lot of opportunities—and took ‘em all.

Last year, Hillary confessed her and her husband’s chief motive over the 14 years since they left the White House: money. She told Diane Sawyer that the family was “dead broke” in 2001 when Bill’s presidency ended. In the White House, she said, “we struggled to, you know, piece together the resources for mortgages, for houses,” and for daughter Chelsea to begin attaining her four college degrees. After the White House years, “you know, it was not easy. Bill has worked really hard . . . . He had to make double the money because of, obviously, taxes . . . and get us houses and take care of family members.”

Looking for a way to stay on top, the Clintons perfected a modern private-public business model: the Clinton Foundation, a charity with the noble-sounding goals of making people around the world healthier and of slowing global climate change. Running a charity, much less a charity operating in Africa, South America, and other global trouble spots, is complicated work, and the Clintons had no experience. No matter: hundreds of millions of dollars poured in. Donors gave to the foundation itself and to Bill directly for making speeches. Between 2001 and 2012, Bill made $105.5 million in such speeches.

During those 12 years, Hillary served her country, first as senator from New York and later as secretary of state. “No one has even come close in recent years to enriching themselves on the scale of the Clintons while . . . a spouse continued to serve in public office,” writes Schweizer. As Hillary moved from Capitol Hill to Foggy Bottom, Bill’s fees went up, especially from governments and business leaders overseas—both prohibited from donating to American candidates or political parties.

Reputable investors shy away from getting involved in places like Nigeria, Russia, Colombia, and Kazakhstan, seeing too much corruption. Not the Clintons. “Bill flew around the world making speeches,” Schweizer writes. “Very often on these trips he was accompanied by ‘close’ friends . . . who happened to have business interests pending in these countries . . . . Meanwhile, bureaucratic or legislative obstacles were mysteriously cleared or approvals granted with the purview of his wife.” The happy ending? “Huge donations . . . flowed into the Clinton Foundation while Bill received enormous speaking fees underwritten by the very businessmen who benefited.”

Let’s take the most egregious example, which reporters independently verified. In 2009, Rosatom, a state-owned Russian nuclear company, started buying up Uranium One, a Canadian firm that owned significant uranium assets in America, thanks to deals that several longtime Clinton associates from Canada had put together in the early 2000s (another interesting story that Schweizer tells). Uranium is an ingredient in nuclear weapons; Russia buying up American uranium is a big deal for several reasons, one of which is that Moscow provides Iran with nuclear materials and technology. The Rosatom deal required State Department approval, through the secretary’s position on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. In 2010, Hillary’s State Department helped wave the Russians through. A few years earlier, she had condemned the George W. Bush-era committee for approving the United Arab Emirates’ purchase of American ports. As Schweizer paraphrases her thinking, “there is a significant difference between a private company and a foreign government entity” buying American assets.

Follow the money trail to see Hillary evolve from being a hawk to a dove here. “Several multimillion-dollar Clinton Foundation donors were at the center” of the Uranium One sale, Schweizer writes. Over the years, people involved in the deal had given or would give more than $145 million to the Clinton Foundation. Uranium One’s chairman, Ian Tefler, a Canadian, indirectly gave more than $2 million when Hillary was secretary of state. The Obama administration likely never knew about it, though, despite the Clintons’ pledge to disclose key foreign donations to the State Department. Tefler, a Canadian, made the donation through Fernwood, his own foundation, but Fernwood’s disclosures to Canadian tax authorities don’t jibe with those made by the Clinton Foundation.

It gets worse. Between 2010 and 2012, the Clinton Foundation and Bill himself took $2.6 million in donations and a speech fee from Salida Capital Foundation, another Canadian entity. Salida itself had just received a $3.3 million anonymous donation. Schweizer uncovered a subsidiary of Rosatom called Salida Capital. “If it were the same firm,” Schweizer writes, “an entity owned and controlled by Rosatom funneled millions of dollars to the Clinton Foundation at the very time Hillary would have been involved in deciding whether to approve Rosatom’s purchase of Uranium One.”

As Hillary’s State Department was deciding whether to approve the deal, Bill showed up in Russia to meet with Vladimir Putin and to give a half-hour speech there, his first in five years. His fee was $500,000, paid by a company called Renaissance Capital. The Clintons told the State Department that RenCap is an investment bank, but they failed to note that, since Putin took over Russia in 2000, RenCap has become “populated by former Russian intelligence officers with close ties to Putin,” as Schweizer writes. One Putin associate held two jobs from 2006 to 2009: domestic-intelligence officer and RenCap first vice president.

It is hard not to conclude that Hillary Clinton took money from Putin’s Russian spies just as the State Department that she controlled had a key role in approving Russia’s purchase of key American nuclear assets. The money just took a circuitous route. The Uranium One deal fails Plunkitt’s “honest graft” test. As Schweizer writes, “the Russian purchase of a large share of America’s uranium assets raised serious national security concerns.”

In 2010, Haiti suffered a catastrophic earthquake. The impoverished nation would require billions in foreign donations to rebuild. Who got himself put in charge of directing those donations? Bill Clinton, as co-chairman of the Interim Haitian Relief Committee. Where would much of the relief money come from? Hillary Clinton, via the U.S. Agency for International Development, a State Department arm. USAID approved cash for a “mobile money initiative” run by Ireland’s Digicel, whose owner, Denis O’Brien, is a key Clinton patron. Bill and Hillary, directly or indirectly, also approved Haiti contracts for companies controlled by Clinton sponsors in housing reconstruction and economic development. The housing contractors performed poorly. Here, too, it’s hard to avoid concluding that the Clintons took money out of the hands of Haitian earthquake survivors. The money again took a circuitous route.

From Kazakhstan to Nigeria, from logging endangered forests to exporting gold, the pattern continues: the Clintons side with oligarchs and their favored politicians over powerless people, animals, and trees. In 2005, Bill traveled to Kazakhstan and stood with that country’s dictator, Nursultan Nazarbayev, a human-rights violator. Just before a sham election, Bill “gave [Nazarbayev] the international credibility he craved,” writes Schweizer. Clinton “praised Nazarbayev for ‘opening up the social and political life of your country.’” The year before, Hillary, as senator, had condemned Nazarbayev’s record. But in 2008, she was a no-show for Senate hearings on that record. In between, a friend of Bill who had secured lucrative Kazakh mining concessions began giving the Clinton Foundation tens of millions of dollars.

Schweizer’s deliberate writing style strengthens his case. There’s no sex and few women. The author relies almost entirely on public documents, from State Department cables via Wikileaks to global tax records to foreign-language press accounts. When he isn’t sure of something, he says so. This is no breathless, Clinton-hating book dependent on third-hand speculation. Even Schweizer’s subtitle is careful: “foreign governments and businesses make Bill and Hillary rich,” he says. They didn’t do it all.

Media Matters, a watchdog over conservative causes, has blasted Schweizer for errors. Some are genuine mistakes—he cites as a source a fake press release—but much of Media Matters’ criticism dings Schweizer for a key point he preemptively conceded in the book: he cannot prove any explicit quid pro quo, and he cannot prove that Hillary directly intervened in many State Department matters. Media Matters’ critique depends, too, on a recent interview that ABC’s George Stephanopoulos did with Schweizer—in which Stephanopoulos failed to disclose that he, too, had donated heavily to the Clinton Foundation.

If, to defend Hillary, you must rely on debating whether the secretary of state indeed has control over the State Department, or, alternatively, if you must whine that Republicans behave badly, too, you have a weak case. With months’ worth of warning, the Clintons have not answered the overriding question: Why take this money and create even the appearance of a scandal? Do they need the millions that badly?

Hillary, now a presidential candidate, participated in actions that seem little different from the alleged actions that got both the New York State Senate leader and the New York State Assembly leader indicted this year—essentially, bribery. Outside of New York, the abuses of these state officials won’t matter much. It matters a lot, however, that the Russians control much of our uranium. That foreign dictators and oligarchs now believe that the American government is biddable matters, too. Ultimately, American voters will have to decide how much. If Americans elect Hillary president, they can’t blame her or her husband for continuing to hold them in contempt.

City Journal

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Wanted: New York Businessmen With Guts

Photo by Andreas Metz

“Here’s my beef with the New York state business community,” charged Westchester County Executive Rob Astorino, after reeling off numbers comparing the state’s wan economic performance with the rest of the country to the state Business Council during his failed gubernatorial bid last fall. “You stand for it. You have the clout, the power, to demand better.” Instead, Astorino noted with exasperation, businessmen wait to see which candidate looks like a winner and then shower him with campaign contributions—even an ex-Sandinista contender like Bill de Blasio, who turned out, as everyone should have foreseen, to be “arguably the most anti-business mayor” in Gotham’s history, said Astorino.

The reason businessmen behave thus, of course, is New York’s deeply ingrained tradition of crony capitalism, in which every big enterprise constantly tries to hold onto, or enrich, its special tax abatements, exemptions, and incentives—and does so by campaign contributions that in a less sophisticated time would look like bribes, and by never uttering a public word of criticism, lest it meet with Putin-style retaliation. Since every deal is “special” rather than systemic, the racket is a hugely successful exercise in divide-and-conquer. Small businesses are of course cut out of this game. And because so few New Yorkers pay income taxes—in Gotham, 1.2 percent of households pay half the income taxes and half the households pay no income tax at all—a taxpayer party, pushing for pro-growth, business-friendly, low-tax policies, is inconceivable.

But here’s something the business community do. The rent-stabilization law, which governs the maximum rent landlords in New York City, along with Nassau, Westchester, and Rockland counties, can charge their tenants, comes up for reauthorization in June. In Gotham, that law covers 960,000 apartments—down by 104,000 apartments in the last two decades, as new laws allowed landlords to remove units from the program if their rents rose above a certain threshold once they become vacant, or if their tenants earned a hefty income. The decontrol—and the confidence landlords have had that rent regulations won’t be expanded—have helped fuel a building boom in the city over the last couple of decades, gentrifying neighborhoods and hugely increasing the wealth and glitter of the city, along with the taxes government takes in to do its highly questionable good works.

To end the entire rent-stabilization program, all the state legislature has to do in June is . . . nothing. But de Blasio wants it to put even sharper teeth in the regulations, because he doesn’t understand that free markets build housing whenever there is demand and where reasonable regulation makes it economically viable, and that “affordable” housing should really mean housing for someone who has worked hard enough to earn a salary that allows him to afford it. It is not the job of the 1.2 percent of taxpaying households to provide housing for all of de Blasio’s “other” New York of welfare recipients and illegal immigrants.

How hard would it be for Gotham’s tycoons to increase their contributions to state legislators from upstate, Staten Island, and other places where people work for a living, to encourage them to let the law expire—especially now that the leaders of both houses of the legislature face possible jail time for their business-as-usual racketeering, which prosecutors seem not to view as beyond reproach? Ah, but the 421-a property tax exemption, which goes to developers like Extell, a builder of hideous and obscenely expensive condos for kleptokrats from Russia and other such racketeering countries, is also up for renewal in June; in its present form, at least, the law provides a few “affordable” apartments in exchange for charging no property taxes to foreign tycoons whose wealth is of unsavory origin and whose contribution to the city is only their big restaurant tips, expensive vodka, and the jewelry they buy for their concubines.

So will Gotham’s businessmen man up in time? Gotham tycoons like Cornelius Vanderbilt and J. P. Morgan once could face down anybody, fearlessly, and solve giant problems, as Morgan stopped the Panic of 1907 almost singlehandedly, overnight. It’s time for their successors in the New York business world to try to be half the men they were.

City JournalThe Founders at Home.

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Teenage Wageland

Photo by Fuse/Thinkstock

In a near-unanimous vote, the Los Angeles City Council has decided to increase the city’s minimum wage from $9 to $15 an hour, a 67 percent change to be phased in over the next five years. Once a measure can be formalized, Mayor Eric Garcetti promises to sign it into law. But if Los Angeles insists on raising the minimum wage, it should exempt workers 22 and younger. Otherwise, the higher minimum will price teens and students out of jobs and prevent them from getting valuable work experience.

Some argue that Los Angeles can easily absorb this increase, because compensation levels in the city are relatively high. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median hourly wage for the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale metro area was $18.32 in 2014. But the presence of many high-paying professions masks the destructive effects the new minimum wage will have on industries that offer entry-level positions. Median wages for local dishwashers, bar backs, ticket takers, and fast-food workers run between $9.00 and $9.10. It’s naïve to assume that all these positions will survive the increase. Businesses don’t have to pay the minimum wage to workers they choose to let go or don’t hire in the first place. Many positions will be automated, or employers will give additional responsibilities to more experienced workers.

California law allows workers between 14 and 17 to earn 85 percent of the minimum wage for their first 160 hours of work. Under the new wage law, teens could then be hired for an hourly wage of $12.75—a good deal for them, but a steep sum for employers to pay a worker with virtually no experience. The full $15 minimum wage will also apply to tipped positions—popular jobs for high school and college students. (The federal tipped minimum wage is $2.13, but tips must bring average hourly pay up to $7.25).

Some workers will get a raise under the new minimum wage, but it will come at the expense of cutting off other people from work opportunities. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office acknowledged this reality last year, when it estimated that 500,000 people would lose their jobs if the federal minimum wage increased to $10.10. The associated job losses would be even larger with a minimum wage of $15.

Wage advocates are celebrating today, but their victory will bring negative effects that Los Angeles can ill afford. A minimum wage more than twice the federal level, even one that is gradually phased in, will be a powerful drag on the city’s labor market and local economy. And no effect will be more harmful—and more inexcusable—than cutting off the first rung of the career ladder for young Americans.

Disinherited: How Washington Is Betraying America’s Young

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The Green Behind California’s Greens

GIPHOTOSTOCK/CORBIS
California’s draconian global-warming laws, mandating that the state get one-third of its power from renewable sources by 2020, are already driving energy costs sky-high.

In the fall of 2010, an army of California groups—including blue-collar unions, small businesses, manufacturers, and big energy companies—tried to persuade voters to suspend the state’s rigorous anti-global-warming law, which mandates a rollback of greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels. The advocates for delaying the law argued that, with an unemployment rate of 12.4 percent, California needed to focus on creating jobs and couldn’t afford costly new measures to slash carbon emissions, such as requiring utilities to generate power from renewable sources. But what proponents of the jobs measure, known as Proposition 23, didn’t count on was the financial might of California’s environmentalists. In just months, greens raised three times as much money as the initiative’s supporters. As the put it, the environmentalists then “steamrolled” their foes with a $30 million campaign that deployed television ads featuring Hollywood celebrities, millions of mailings, and hundreds of thousands of robo-calls and text messages. One environmentalist described the coalition that crushed Prop. 23—comprising entertainers, hedge-fund honchos, technology billionaires, and the many organizations that they back—as “the new face of the environmental movement.” It wasn’t the face of the movement, though, but its pocketbook that won the battle.

Californians have long had a green reputation. But for many years, interest in the environment expressed itself in modest programs of nature conservation, or in efforts to mitigate pollution problems such as the smog that once choked the state’s cities. Even as they gained political power over the last 15 years or so, however, California greens have moved steadily leftward—touting, for example, zero-growth initiatives that make it crazily expensive to create jobs, housing, and infrastructure. Credit, or blame, for this development should go to a small circle of superrich Californians, who made their fortunes chiefly in so-called clean industries like technology and finance, and who have poured vast sums of money into the green cause. These wealthy individuals bankroll hundreds of environmental organizations and spend massively to pass green ballot initiatives and elect green-friendly pols. So influential are these West Coast players that a recent report from Columbia University’s Journalism School—otherwise sympathetic to environmentalism—described the concentration of green power as “troubling.” Even more disconcerting, these true believers also seem intent on promoting their aggressive form of environmentalism around the country. Call it the Californication of the green movement.

California’s concern for nature has moved far from its origins. Back in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the state’s extraordinary beauty helped give rise to the antecedents of modern environmentalism. John Muir embodied the conservationist and preservationist spirit of the era. A Scottish immigrant with a deep love for the outdoors, Muir helped to get Congress in 1890 to establish Yosemite National Park in the central eastern part of the state and in 1892 cofounded the Sierra Club as a means for Californians to enjoy—and protect—the magnificent Sierra Nevada mountain range. Several decades later, a young San Francisco resident, Ansel Adams, discovered Yosemite, joined the Sierra Club, and, with a Brownie camera that his father had given him, began photographing the California landscape. Adams’s romantic vistas captured mid-twentieth-century America’s imagination, and he used his artistic influence to reinforce Muir’s appeals to preserve Yosemite.

ANSEL ADAMS PUBLISHING RIGHTS TRUST/CORBIS
Early California environmentalism focused on conserving the state’s natural beauty, as captured by this Ansel Adams photograph of Yosemite National Park . . .

Struggles over the protection of undeveloped parts of California characterized the green movement for decades, until a new type of environmentalism began to emerge in the 1960s, amid growing concerns about the impact of pollution on air, water, and soil. The recognition that the burning of leaded gasoline generated urban smog prompted Californians—living in a state with the nation’s greatest number of automobiles—to lobby for better air quality. In 1967, Republican governor Ronald Reagan signed a law setting up an agency to pursue that end—the first such state environmental body in the country.

Drawing on new intellectual currents, Reagan’s successor, Democrat Jerry Brown, took office in 1975 proselytizing for a more radical form of environmentalism. In 1973, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss had characterized conservation programs and efforts to limit the harmful effects of pollution as mere “shallow ecology.” Næss instead propounded a sweeping “deep ecology,” which argued that every living thing had a right to its existence and which sought sharply to constrain human activity. That same year, the economist E. F. Schumacher authored the bestseller , a book promoting a “sustainable economics” based on limits to growth. Brown’s governing agenda showed the influence of these ideas, including a reduced pace of government-sponsored infrastructure construction and other development. Some of the consequences of Brown’s left-green enthusiasms proved too much for Californians to swallow, however. In 1980, a Mediterranean fruit-fly infestation threatened the state’s crops, but the governor hesitated to attack the outbreak with pesticides. By the time Brown ordered spraying, the pest had spread so extensively that buyers were threatening to boycott the state’s produce. Brown’s popularity plummeted, short-circuiting his bid to win a U.S. Senate seat in 1982. For the next 16 years, his successors—Republicans George Deukmejian and Pete Wilson—often used their office to check the power of environmentalists, including those working for the government’s environmental bureaucracies, which had proliferated during the 1970s.

BETTMANN/CORBIS
. . . but by the 1970s, in his first tenure as governor, Jerry Brown was pushing a more radical brand of environmentalism.

Despite forcing this temporary pushback, California’s greens would be emboldened by mutations in the state’s economy. For decades, two largely blue-collar industries—manufacturing and agriculture—had driven the state’s economic growth. But in the early 1960s, advances in semiconductors transformed the area around Stanford University and San Jose—once known as the Valley of the Heart’s Delight because of its agricultural riches—into the center of American technological innovation: Silicon Valley. With this dramatic shift came staggering affluence, not only from the technology being invented but also from burgeoning financial services, which took off in the Valley and nearby San Francisco to help fund the tech boom. A 2013 census report found that the greater San Jose/Santa Clara area, the heart of Silicon Valley, had the nation’s second-highest concentration of wealth, behind only Connecticut’s suburban bedroom communities, filled with high-paid Wall Streeters. The San Francisco peninsula, home to many working in the Valley’s tech industries, ranked as America’s fourth-wealthiest metro area.

The riches of two Silicon Valley pioneers, David Packard and William Hewlett, have flowed heavily into California environmental causes—though not because the men themselves directed much money that way. The Stanford engineering students famously started Hewlett-Packard in 1939 out of a Palo Alto garage, with an initial investment of just $538. By the time Packard resigned as chairman of the board in 1993, ending active management by either of the cofounders, their respective stock holdings were worth billions. The pair poured lots of that money into philanthropy. Packard, who served as Richard Nixon’s deputy secretary of defense, spent philanthropic dollars on scientific fellowships, children’s health care, and family and youth problems. His giving also supported conservative policy nonprofits, including the American Enterprise Institute. When he died in 1996, the Packard Foundation received some $4 billion of his estate; it now has $6 billion in assets. Hewlett’s charitable dollars helped pay for scientific research, efforts to solve urban woes, and the arts. His modest contributions to the environmental cause focused mostly on the philanthropic work of his wife, Flora, who had spent some of her youth in the Sierra Nevada and wanted to protect the area’s beauty. Hewlett died in 2001; today, his foundation’s assets approach $8 billion.

Since the deaths of HP’s cofounders, their heirs have pushed the two foundations’ philanthropy ever-leftward, and activist environmentalism is a prime beneficiary. Under the direction of Packard’s three daughters, the conservative Republican’s philanthropic wealth has gone to the National Abortion Rights Action League Foundation, the Feminist Majority Foundation, and the very green Earth Action Network. This liberal giving has prompted Packard’s son, David, whose political views are closer to his father’s, to withdraw his money from the foundation and form his own nonprofit, which gives to more traditional and nonpolitical causes.

In a signature moment in green giving, the Packard and Hewlett Foundations decided in 2007 to boost their spending on climate-change issues, funneling the money into a new, San Francisco–based nonprofit, ClimateWorks, led initially by the former head of environmental programs at Hewlett. The Hewlett Foundation, according to the Columbia Journalism School report, agreed to put $500 million into ClimateWorks, with the Packard Foundation adding approximately $390 million since 2008. Two other major California funders have joined Packard and Hewlett in the climate-change cause: the Energy Foundation, a San Francisco nonprofit that bundles smaller contributions into large environmental grants; and the San Francisco–based Sea Change Foundation, created by Nathaniel Simons, son of the enormously successful New York hedge-fund manager Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies. The younger Simons operates his own fund, Meritage, based in San Francisco, and has been described by as the “quiet hedge fund manager engaged in massive climate giving.”

Generous funders of the California environmental movement include other wealthy Silicon Valley techno-environmentalists and San Francisco hedge-fund greens. Intel Corporation cofounder Gordon Moore and his wife set up the Palo Alto–based Moore Foundation in 2000, staking it with $5 billion, largely accumulated through Intel stock. Moore initially targeted some of his green philanthropy at conservation, an interest he had developed as a recreational fisherman. But he, too, has veered toward antigrowth environmentalism, channeling huge amounts of money to nonprofits and trusts so that they can buy up land in Northern California and freeze future development. Moore has also spent money on green politics, including $1 million on the 2010 campaign to thwart Prop. 23. Just minutes from Moore’s foundation in Palo Alto is the charity founded by Google executive Eric Schmidt and his wife, Wendy: the $300 million Schmidt Foundation. The Schmidts have been large funders of major California environmentalist players like the Energy Foundation, but through their 11th Hour project, they also back smaller local environmental efforts, including anti-fracking research and campaigns to ban or restrict oil and gas exploration. The Schmidts gave half a million dollars to defeat Prop. 23.

The most visible of California’s rich environmentalists is Tom Steyer, who led the anti–Prop. 23 effort and seeded it with $5 million of his own money. Steyer made headlines in 2014 by pledging to invest $100 million in congressional campaigns in seven states, seeking to influence federal climate policy. Operating out of his 1,800-acre ranch in Pescadero, he and his wife have also pumped money into the TomKat Charitable Trust, based in San Francisco, which focuses on giving to “organizations that envision a world with climate stability, a healthy and just food system, and broad prosperity.”

Getting a clear view on the giving by these nonprofits, and by the individuals behind them, isn’t easy. For instance, Steyer made a good deal of his fortune as a hedge-fund chief investing in fossil fuels, the spread of which he now so opposes. Farallon Capital, where Steyer served as CEO and where he still has holdings, has invested heavily in a company that is building a competitor to the proposed Keystone XL pipeline—which Steyer is spending money to stop on environmental grounds. These investments, as the put it, “cloud” Steyer’s environmentalist reputation. Meantime, the Simonses’ Sea Change Foundation receives substantial sums from a Bermuda entity, Klein Ltd., with undisclosed sources of revenue. Indeed, there’s little public information about Sea Change. The nonprofit’s entire online presence, described by as “quite possibly the least informative [charitable organization] website,” is a single page announcing that it does not accept unsolicited grant requests. One reason for the secrecy may be that Klein Ltd. shares an address with a Bermuda law firm that represents investors in Russian energy companies—prompting reports that some of the money that Sea Change showers on environmental groups in the U.S. may come from overseas oil interests, eager to kill fracking.

Whatever the source and purpose of the money, much of the giving in the California environmental movement ultimately seems to involve this handful of funders, contributing to the perception, even within environmentalist circles, that rich elites run the show. To combat the elitism label, the foundations devote a portion of their wealth to sustain hundreds of small, community-based organizations throughout the state. The Schmidt Foundation’s 11th Hour project, for example, has made hundreds of smaller grants to local groups working to stir green passion among clergy, journalists, small farmers, college students, and other constituencies. One such nonprofit is the San Francisco–based, clergy-led Interfaith Power and Light, which sponsors “preach-ins” about climate change. The 14-acre Pie Ranch in Pescadero, which educates high school students in the Bay Area in the “economic, social, environmental and political implications” of food, is another recipient of Schmidt money. Others include Oakland’s CoFED, which helps students create nonprofit college food cooperatives; and Physicians for Social Responsibility, who aim to “educate communities, the general public and policy makers on the importance of California’s climate laws.”

Some of this local giving bolsters green organizations that claim to represent constituencies not typically associated with environmentalism, helping to counter the criticism that the movement is made up mainly of “aging, white Americans,” as the put it. Schmidt money backs Los Angeles’s Communities for a Better Environment, which tries to mobilize “people of color—African-American, Latino, Filipino” to lobby for curbs on greenhouse gases. The Packard Foundation and Schmidt support Oakland’s People’s Grocery, which describes itself as “a leader in the evolving food justice movement”—that is, food produced in “sustainable” ways—in inner cities. Schmidt also funds Green for All, the Oakland-based nonprofit founded by former Obama environmental advisor Van Jones, “which works to make sure people of color have a place and a voice in the climate movement.” The Hewlett Foundation has given nearly $2 million to the BlueGreen Alliance, a nonprofit with offices in San Francisco and Minneapolis that tries to bring blue-collar private-worker unions into the green movement.

Generating enthusiasm from these constituencies for California’s brand of environmentalism is a challenge. When the BlueGreen Alliance announced its opposition to the Keystone XL pipeline, the head of the Laborers’ International Union of North America blasted it for trying to deep-six a project that promised to create thousands of jobs. (See “State of Disunion,” Winter 2015.) The union bolted the alliance. Similarly, last summer, 16 California Democratic legislators from areas of the state with high unemployment tried but failed to persuade party leaders to suspend portions of the state’s anti-global-warming law. Many of the legislators, two-thirds of whom were minorities, hailed from districts representing struggling inland communities like Fresno, San Bernardino, and Modesto, or from troubled minority neighborhoods in Los Angeles and other cities. Their letter to the Democratic leadership in the assembly warned that the cap-and-trade requirements of the anti-global-warming law are “weakening the economy just as California is recovering from the last recession, and hurting the most vulnerable members of our communities.”

The California environmental movement’s primary work isn’t grassroots organizing and proselytizing, however: it’s the lobbying, campaigning, and legal advocacy of behemoths like the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and Earthjustice—a $40 million public-interest law firm that calls itself “the Earth’s lawyer.” These giants derive much of their considerable funding from superrich donors. Since 2010, the Sierra Club has pulled in at least $5 million from the Sea Change Foundation, about $4 million from the Energy Foundation, $2.4 million from the Hewlett Foundation, and another $500,000 from Schmidt. That kind of money attracts environmental advocates from elsewhere in the country, too. Over the last four years, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), headquartered in New York, received $1.5 million from the Schmidt Foundation, $2.42 million from the Hewlett Foundation, $4 million from Sea Change, and more than $10 million from the Energy Foundation. The EDF, also New York–based, got $600,000 from Hewlett, $1.1 million from Sea Change, and nearly $2.5 million from the Energy Foundation over that same period. No surprise that both the NRDC and the EDF have major operations in California these days.

The green giants have increasingly sought to impose expansive environmental policies through the courts. In this respect, they’ve learned from liberal judicial activists, who, failing to win their goals legislatively, have sought redress through the courts for everything from more public school funding to greater public housing subsidies. (See “Brennan’s Revenge,” Winter 2014.) In fact, recent green policymaking in California often derives not from popular votes or legislative actions but from judicial rulings. Earthjustice has been a major promoter of this trend. The group serves as legal counsel to several well-funded California environmentalist organizations litigating to limit new development, halt the expansion of businesses, and force firms and individuals to spend additional millions on environmental permits and legal costs. Recent cases brought by Earthjustice include an attempt to force the Port of Long Beach to stop allowing coal exports from its facilities. California’s environmental lawyers now also regularly challenge contracts made by the state’s utilities for the purchase of fossil-fuel-generated electricity, contending that they should buy more energy from renewable resources. And green lawyers press California’s utilities regulators to strong-arm energy firms to invest more in renewable-energy infrastructure.

Perhaps no environmentalist legal gambit has had more profound consequences on Californians than the nearly decade-long court battle waged by the NRDC and Earthjustice to protect the delta smelt, a three-inch baitfish, under the Endangered Species Act. (See “California’s Water Wars,” Summer 2011.) The greens have long sought to curtail water transfers from northern reservoirs to other parts of the state, including Central Valley farms; such transfers, they believe, violate California’s natural order. Now the green lawyers charge that the water transfers have disrupted the smelt’s habitat, endangering the species. The delta smelt’s numbers have shrunk, but research published in 2010 by Patricia Gilbert of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science suggests that the fish’s decline is attributable to wastewater flowing into the Sacramento–San Joaquin Bay Delta. Nevertheless, courts have ordered reduced water flows, one consequence of which has been dramatically to worsen the effects of California’s three-year drought—forcing farmers to retire formerly productive and now-parched land, lay off workers, and spend heavily to pump water from deep in the ground. (See “The Scorching of California,” Winter 2015.) Recently, the Ninth Court of Appeals in San Francisco ruled that the lowly smelt deserves “the highest of priorities . . . even if it means the sacrifice of . . . many millions of dollars in public funds.” That ruling sums up the ethos of the environmentalists who’ve funded and fought this legal battle.

Green greenbacks are also remaking California’s politics. While the fight over Prop. 23 in 2010 may have displayed the “new face” of the environmental movement in the state, the battles over a pair of 2006 California initiatives revealed the massive resources that green donors can now wield politically. One campaign (successful) sought to defeat Proposition 90, an initiative that would have curtailed eminent domain—the taking of private property by California governments for public purposes. Environmental backers lined up against it because it limited the power of state bureaucracies like the California Coastal Commission to make demands on private property owners and enabled owners to sue for compensation when government rulings battered the value of their properties. To stop the initiative, California greens formed the Conservationists for Taxpayer Protection, who raised some $1.9 million, including donations from the California League of Conservation Voters, the NRDC, the Sierra Club, and the EDF.

That same election cycle, greens also tried (unsuccessfully) to win passage of Proposition 87, an initiative that would have slapped $4 billion in new taxes on energy companies in California and then invested the revenue in renewable-power projects. The force behind it was real-estate heir Stephen Bing, who used a nearly $600 million fortune to turn himself into a Hollywood film producer and a prominent giver to Democratic causes on the West Coast. For the Prop. 87 campaign, he spent nearly $50 million of his own money, the largest personal expenditure ever made on a California ballot measure. Other green donors kicked in $10 million, including Wendy Schmidt ($1 million) and Nathaniel Simons ($225,000). The oil industry countered with $94 million of its own spending, making Prop. 87 the costliest California initiative in history.

Green causes increasingly dominate California’s individual political races, too. Their takeover advanced decisively in 1996, when a green-activist group, Vote the Coast, targeted a handful of state assembly seats in wealthier coastal areas and helped get seven environmentally oriented Democratic candidates elected. That tipped the assembly to the Democrats and created an environmental caucus in the lower house.

The new assembly majority proceeded to fill the state’s environmental bureaucracies with left-environmentalists, making those bodies much more likely to side with greens against businesses and landowners in any disputes. “There is a pitched competition between California agencies for which is the most nonsensical in its implementation of over-reaching regulations,” public affairs consultant Laer Pearce observed last year. The California Air Resources Board, he noted, has “tried to ban black cars in the state in its fevered effort to save the world from global warming.” The California Energy Commission has outlawed large high-performance plasma televisions because they burn up too much energy. The Coastal Commission—originally created to oversee coastal development in California—has relentlessly extended its reach over the property of individuals and businesses, often refusing to let owners build or rebuild structures, and even objecting to the type of beach furniture that homeowners use. The commission’s radical character was captured in the title of a 2014 speech by one of its retiring Democratic-appointed commissioners: “In Defense of Unreasonableness—Saving the California Coast.”

“Unreasonable” is an apt description for how environmentalist groups approach California political races. columnist Tim Herdt complained last year that greens were now “hugging a tree too hard” in choosing candidates to back. The League of Conservation Voters, Herdt pointed out, spent $50,000 in a 2014 primary in an overwhelmingly Democratic district simply to try to elect the candidate with the greenest of green records. Local office seekers in some coastal areas must run a gauntlet of well-funded environmentalists if they want to win. For incumbents, proving nature-friendly credentials becomes an ongoing challenge. “Candidates who filled out the Sierra Club’s and [California League of Conservation Voters’] questionnaires this spring faced a minefield of potential litmus tests. They were asked about fracking, climate change, clear-cutting, proposed tunnels to divert Sacramento River water, offshore oil drilling, CEQA [California Environmental Quality Act] reform, renewable energy mandates, a ban on plastic bags and more,” Herdt observed. Even Jerry Brown doesn’t pass muster any more. The Sierra Club refused to endorse anyone in the 2014 governor’s race, explaining that it had major differences on issues like fracking with Governor Brown, a onetime environmentalist darling.

California politics is likely to grow greener still. After spending millions across the country in the 2014 election cycle, Steyer plans to bring his environmentalist giving back to the Golden State. He also may be considering a run for office—probably the governorship—in 2018. If so, environmentalism will be the Number One theme of his self-funded campaign. “The fight for justice starts with climate,” he recently observed.

If the past is any guide, a Steyer governorship would be exceedingly costly to California businesses. In 2012, he spent $30 million of his own money on a successful initiative to hike taxes by $1 billion on out-of-state firms operating in California, with half of the revenues from the tax going to projects that promote conservation and renewable energy. California, burdened by high taxes and labyrinthine regulations, consistently ranks dead last as a place to do business in ’s annual survey of company executives. Environmental policy plays a huge role in the difficulties of operating in the state, especially for blue-collar industries. A 2014 study by Pepperdine University’s Michael Shires found that, thanks in part to the costs of California’s global-warming law and other regulations, manufacturers in the state must pay 40 percent above the national average for electricity.

Small wonder that the recent U.S. manufacturing revival has largely bypassed the Golden State. Though the country has added 660,000 industrial jobs over the last half-decade, California has managed to create a meager 8,000 such positions during that period—a 0.6 percent rate of growth. By contrast, Texas has generated 72,000 new industrial jobs. “High energy costs now make it too easy for out-of-state companies to undercut California manufacturers, take away their customers and hurt jobs,” says Dorothy Rothrock, president of the California Manufacturers and Technology Association.

Even green firms are looking elsewhere. Be Green Packaging, a Santa Barbara recycling company, recently built a manufacturing plant in South Carolina; Biocentric Energy Holdings, a Santa Ana energy company, moved to Salt Lake City in 2011; and Bing Energy, a fuel-cell maker, relocated to Florida in 2011. “I just can’t imagine any corporation in their right mind would decide to set up in California today,” the company’s CFO said. (See “Cali to Business: Get Out!,” Autumn 2011.) And while the revival of tech firms in the last few years has produced lots of high-paid white-collar Silicon Valley jobs, tech companies are sending their industrial and customer-service work to less expensive locales. Intel, the Santa Clara business that Gordon Moore cofounded, built a $3 billion production facility in Arizona in 2008. Google has built its massive, energy-gobbling server farms outside California, including in cheaper Oregon. San Jose’s eBay has been adding work in Austin, Texas, since 2011, part of a plan to expand by 1,000 jobs there. In 2013, after years of manufacturing exclusively overseas, Cupertino-based Apple decided to build a new production facility—in Texas. Apple is also spending $2 billion to outfit a new data center in Mesa, outside Phoenix.

Having reshaped the Golden State, California’s greens are now financing the spread of the environmentalist gospel to other states and to Canada. In 2012, for instance, a group of green funders, powered by California money, helped push on to Michigan’s ballot the Michigan Renewable Energy Amendment, known as Proposal 3, the aim of which was to require that at least 25 percent of the state’s energy come from renewable sources by 2025. The face of Prop. 3 was a local group, Michigan Energy–Michigan Jobs, with a $4 million campaign purse, according to state campaign records. But most of that money ($3.3 million) came from a San Francisco entity, the Green Tech Action Fund, which, in turn, receives most of its funding from its Frisco neighbor, the giant Energy Foundation—which gets much of money from Sea Change, the Hewlett and Packard Foundations, and ClimateWorks. Notwithstanding the huge influx of outside money, Prop. 3 went down to defeat, earning just 38 percent of the Michigan vote.

Undeterred, California’s environmentalist funders have also helped finance initiatives in Colorado to ban fracking and a failed Nebraska effort to stop the Keystone XL pipeline. The Hewlett Foundation, Sea Change, and another Bay Area group, the Tides Foundation, have been behind a decades-long effort to stymie the development of vast oil reserves in Alberta, Canada.

Americans in places like Michigan and Nebraska have yet to embrace the left-environmentalism preached by the green activists—the antigrowth, frequently antihuman notions of deep ecology. But California is different. It may be the first state on the way to embracing deep ecology as public policy—thanks to the power of its green movement, fueled by billions of dollars earned in America’s pro-growth free markets.

City JournalShakedown: The Continuing Conspiracy Against the American Taxpayer.

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America Meets Mayor Bill

Photographer/Mayoral Photography Office
Mayor Bill de Blasio unveils his “Progressive Agenda to Combat Income Inequality” at the Capitol in Washington, D.C.

Who is this guy? That’s the first question most Americans will ask about Bill de Blasio and his just-released, 13-point Progressive Agenda to Combat Income Inequality. Since, in this case, the messenger is at least part of the message, here are some things America should know about New York City’s 109th mayor.

In November 2013, de Blasio beat his Republican opponent for mayor, Joe Lhota, by almost 50 percentage points. His approval ratings have dipped since then, and he hasn’t gotten everything he has sought from Governor Andrew Cuomo and the New York State legislature. But despite the press’s attempts to stir something up between de Blasio and city comptroller Scott Stringer, the mayor faces no major opposition at the city level. De Blasio even personally selected the current speaker of the city council, Melissa Mark-Viverito.

On the policy front, however, all the de Blasio administration has to show so far are what can charitably be called “inputs.” De Blasio established universal pre-K in New York City, but it won’t be possible to evaluate the quality of the program for years. The mayor’s high-profile commitment to “creat[e] and preserv[e] 200,000 units of affordable housing over ten years” is, at this point, little more than a commitment. And that’s to say nothing about the potential long-term consequences of the policies de Blasio will use to enact his housing program, such as dumping more low-income units into neighborhoods already saturated with them.

Like President Obama, de Blasio believes that history has “sides,” and he is confident that he and his policies will gain support over time. Progressive policymaking, as he sees it, is about staying the course. Thus, where others might see a need to make tradeoffs, de Blasio believes he can have it all. He sees no inconsistency in addressing the New York City Housing Authority’s multibillion-dollar maintenance backlog through overpriced union labor. Steven Banks, de Blasio’s Human Resources Administration commissioner, has relaxed workfare requirements on the justification that a more lenient welfare policy will reduce dependency and lead to more employment for poor New Yorkers.

De Blasio’s approach to governance both resembles and contrasts with that of David Dinkins, the last liberal to serve as mayor of New York City (1989-93). Dinkins, too, came into office with big progressive plans, but a wave of violence and rioting engulfed his mayoralty. Perhaps learning from this history, de Blasio is determined not to be a reactive mayor; he wants nothing to deter him from the battle against income inequality, his core concern. To prevent crime and disorder from overtaking his agenda, de Blasio appointed William Bratton as his police commissioner, ceding authority over public safety to a degree that he would never consider doing with welfare or housing.

If rioting breaks out in more American cities, law and order will surely become an issue during the 2016 presidential campaign. Republicans have a natural advantage in public-safety debates. But if de Blasio and Bratton succeed in keeping the lid on things in New York (far from guaranteed), they will offer a model to other Democrats about how to confront disorder.

De Blasio’s ascent illustrates the political resonance of the anti-inequality message. Failed politicians don’t propose national agendas. Progressives cheer when de Blasio denounces inequality, just as conservatives appreciate it when politicians speak honestly about the consequences of family breakdown. And some evidence suggests that the inequality agenda could play outside blue America, at least to a degree. For example, last fall, four red states voted to raise the minimum wage. Paid sick leave, another plank in the de Blasio program, polls well, too. Conservatives who dismiss de Blasio’s rise as just a New York story do so at their peril.

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Letterman’s Farewell

Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images

On May 20, the ever-fresh will play its last engagement. After more than four decades on the TV screen, the show’s host is fading out. Letterman’s retirement was not exactly a surprise, even for devotees. He turns 68 this year; Johnny Carson was two years younger when he called it quits. Though the veteran comedian/emcee seems robust, he underwent quintuple-bypass surgery years ago, and there has been scuttlebutt about other medical issues since then. But the real reason for the move has less to do with Letterman than with his audience. Young talk-show devotees (CBS’s target audience) have begun to drift away to the Jimmies—Jimmy Fallon (age 41) and Jimmy Kimmel (47)—as well as to edgier late-night offerings.

Even so, Letterman will remain in public memory for a long time. Many still recall him as a brash newcomer from flyover country, with a headful of ideas and a take-no-prisoners approach to celebrity. Indiana-born and bred, Letterman had notorious clashes with film and pop stars including Cher, Shirley MacLaine, and Madonna. He put animal absurdities into the national conversation when he introduced Stupid Pet Tricks (Dachshunds on a treadmill, a rabbit that walks on two feet, a Yorkie that answers the question “Who’s the President?” by growling “Obama.”) And of course, he created his trademark Top Ten lists.

These included: Top Ten Ways Las Vegas is Better Than Paris (Number 4: Vegas didn’t lose a single inch of ground to the Nazi war machine); Subway Punk’s Top 10 Etiquette Tips (Number 10: When passing a screwdriver to a friend, remember, it’s HANDLE FIRST); Top 10 Courses Taken by Texas A & M Players (Number 8: Sandwich-making [final project required]); Top 10 Least Popular Fairy Tales (Number 7: The Little Old Lady Who Lived in Al Sharpton’s Hair); Top 10 Questions Asked of Miss America Contestants (Number 3: Are those real?); Top 10 Least-used Hyphenated Words (Number 4: Hitler-riffic); and Top 10 Rejected Halftime Shows for the Super Bowl (Number 8: A Thousand Shirtless Drunk Guys in Rainbow Wigs).

Though King David now seems serene, his has been a troubled rule. When Carson retired in 1992, Letterman was widely considered the heir apparent. Instead, NBC chose Jay Leno. Letterman shrugged off the rejection and went to CBS, where, after an early lead, his ratings consistently trailed Leno’s. In 1995, he hosted the Academy Awards. As the reviews noted, Hollywood was not his milieu. No one was more sardonic about the debacle than Letterman himself: “Looking back, I had no idea that thing was being televised.”

In 2009 came a tasteless sex joke about Sarah Palin’s 14- and 18-year old daughters. Not only Palin, but also the National Organization of Women took him to task, and Letterman delivered an on-air apology “especially to the two daughters involved, Bristol and Willow, and also the governor and her family and everybody else who was outraged by the joke.” A few months later, Letterman was threatened by an anonymous blackmailer who threatened to expose the host’s extramarital affairs with employees of his production company, Worldwide Pants. Letterman was not about to pay the demanded $2 million. Instead, he called the district attorney and made a public confession of his private amours with a personal assistant and an intern. He apologized yet again, this time to his wife and staff. The blackmailer was traced, tried, and jailed, and the went on—and on and on.

Now, after more than 6,000 evenings, host, fans, and critics have mellowed. Forgiveness is the operative word, and a fond look back at Letterman’s career includes an unprecedented 52 Emmy nominations and five primetime Emmy Awards. He was the first recipient of the Johnny Carson Award for Comic Excellence. His alma mater, Ball State University in Muncie, named an impressive structure in his honor: the David Letterman Communication and Media Building. (Naturally, his acceptance speech listed the Top Ten good things about seeing one’s moniker in stone letters. Number 10: If reasonable people can put my name on a building, anything is possible.) And, at the 2012 Kennedy Center Honors, Letterman was recognized as “one of the most influential personalities in the history of television, entertaining an entire generation of late-night viewers with his unconventional wit and charm.”

All this for a man who admits, “I can’t sing, dance or act. What else would I be but a talk show host?” A good thing he was no John Travolta, Tony Bennett, or Robert De Niro. Millions would have been deprived of a uniquely American talent. Goodnight, David, and thanks for the laughter in the dark.

City JournalThe Eskimo Hunts in the Twin Cities.

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The ACA’s Unintended Consequences

Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images

As a Supreme Court decision looms next month in v. , which could determine the future of Obamacare, much of the economic discussion surrounding the Affordable Care Act (ACA) focuses, understandably, on the law’s effects on insurance premiums and on the delivery of health care. But the ACA also has significant potential to affect the allocation of labor—and thus wages—throughout the U.S. economy, through its penalties for employers that don’t provide health insurance for their workers as well as through its subsidies for individuals to purchase health insurance (the latter of which is the subject of the case). The employer penalties and the individual subsidies will exert a downward effect on average wages and on wage patterns, across industry sectors and income levels. And because the law privileges certain kinds of businesses over others, it will also reduce productivity.

One way to understand this is through Adam Smith’s theory of equalizing differences, through which we can trace and quantify the effects of the employer penalty and the exchange subsidies on wages and productivity. Doing so, I found that, overall, the ACA will reduce wages by $1,000 per year—or about 4 percent of wages for workers from low-income families and nearly 2 percent of wages for workers from higher-income families. Quite distinct from the ACA’s impact on insurance availability and on the quality of health care, these effects should be better understood.

To help the uninsured get health-insurance coverage, the ACA created what it calls “health-insurance exchanges,” the collection of policies offered to each state’s residents by private insurance companies, subject to state and federal regulations regarding standardization of policy benefits, provisions, and pricing. Many, but not all, individuals shop on the exchanges by visiting a website that gathers customer information and quotes prices. Most people getting insurance through the exchanges receive financial assistance in up to two ways: reduced insurance premiums (administered through an income-tax credit system) or reduced out-of-pocket health costs, such as co-payments and deductibles. I collectively refer to the two subsidies as “exchange subsidies.”

Because exchange subsidies are available only to persons not eligible for affordable employer coverage, the ACA requires that large employers either provide affordable coverage or pay a penalty, computed according to how many full-time employees they have. The law defines a large employer as one with at least 50 full-time-equivalent employees in the calendar year prior to the one in which it failed to provide coverage. (Part-time employees count toward full-time equivalents in proportion to their hours worked.) Unlike employee wages, the penalty is not deductible for the purpose of determining the employer’s business-income tax—and this fact, together with the law’s procedure for indexing the penalty to health-cost inflation, means that the employer penalty in 2016 (the first year in which it will be fully enforced) would be as costly as $3,163 per employee on the full-time payroll beyond 30 employees.

Because the cost of the penalty to their employer could cause a reduction in wages or even the loss of their jobs, workers at penalized employers would appear, at first glance, to be losers here. However, as workers leave penalized employers and compete for jobs at employers that do offer coverage (hereafter “ESI employers,” for “employer-sponsored insurance”), they drive down wages at these employers and mitigate some of the penalty’s effect on wages at employers that don’t offer coverage (hereafter, “non-ESI employers”). It would work something like this: among groups of workers earning roughly the same amount, the ACA penalty takes part of the pay of the non-ESI (i.e., penalized) sector. Employees leave the penalized sector to take advantage of the higher ESI-sector pay. The more employees who seek work in the ESI sector, the less ESI employers need to pay for them. At the same time, the more employees who leave the penalized sector, the more the penalized employers are willing to pay the employees who remain. Non-ESI employees, then, will be partially compensated for the penalty-free opportunities existing outside their sector. The newly depressed pay among ESI employees amounts to a hidden tax on these workers: the employer penalty reduces their pay, even though their employers don’t pay it. In effect, penalized employees escape part of their penalty by passing it on to ESI employees.

Here is how the father of economics, Adam Smith, explained such a dynamic: “If . . . there was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other [think “employer penalty”], that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments.”

The wage cut for ESI employees is known in the economics trade as a “compensating” or “equalizing” difference. In effect, workers pay part of the employer penalty, even when their employer is not penalized. The effect of the employer penalty on employee pay increases with the size of the penalty itself, but it also depends on the size of the non-ESI sector. The larger the non-ESI sector, the more that ESI wages will have to fall in order to absorb workers leaving the sector. A helpful estimate of the amount that the penalty depresses overall wages is the product of the penalty and the non-ESI share of the labor market. In other words, the larger the penalty, or the larger the number of workers at penalized employers, the greater the wage effect.

Table 1 shows three estimates, one in each column. The first column pertains to workers in relatively low-income families—those at or below three times the federal poverty line (FPL). The second column pertains to workers in moderate- to high-income families, and the final column summarizes all workers.

Table 1. The wage impact of the 2016 employer penalty, assuming no productivity loss

The table’s top row shows the size of the penalty, which is the salary equivalent of $3,163, regardless of family income. The second row shows the fraction of workers who work full-time for an employer that doesn’t offer coverage and will be penalized if expanding beyond 49 employees. For low-income workers, that fraction is 0.22, or 22 percent of all employment by low-income workers.

The last row, in bold, shows the penalty’s overall wage impact: $683 per year on low-income workers and $510 on moderate- to high-income workers. For all workers, the penalty impact averages $577 per year. The bad news for ESI workers is that, in effect, they help pay the penalties owed by ’ employers, in the form of lower wages. The good news for non-ESI workers is that their wage is not depressed nearly as much as the penalty itself, which is effectively $3,163 per year.

Because its provisions will effectively favor certain kinds of businesses over others, the Affordable Care Act will also have negative effects on economic productivity (which refers to the value created in the economy per hour worked) and therefore additional effects on average wages. The incentives built in to the ACA will have the effect of distorting the market equilibrium between small and large businesses. In a market economy, small and large businesses take on the types of activities that profit most from their advantages and that minimize their disadvantages; the marketplace, in turn, allocates activity between small and large firms to maximize total value to customers, employees, and owners.

Starbucks, for example, which operates thousands of coffee shops, most of which are company-owned, coexists in many markets with independent coffee shops and with franchised coffee shops like Dunkin’ Donuts. The consumer market for coffee is thereby continually allocating employees, materials, and customers among these types of shops on the basis of location, employee preferences, and consumer tastes. The market at one location may support a Starbucks rather than the other choices because Starbucks’ upscale product or familiar brand appeals more to the customers in that area, or because employees especially appreciate the benefits of working for Starbucks. At the same time, an independent shop may be better positioned in another location, where the owner is especially familiar with the local area’s customers, or where employees appreciate a small-business working environment rather than a corporate one. The market creates value for customers and employees by featuring a mix of suppliers. Forcing (that is, without the consent of any of the market participants) one type of shop to be replaced by another type would destroy some of that value.

The ACA doesn’t force coffee shops to change type; but through its penalties and subsidies, it exerts a strong influence unrelated to the fundamental customer, employee, and owner preferences in that marketplace. The employer mandate pushes small employers to replace large ones—for example, an independent shop would replace one of the Dunkin’ Donuts locations owned by a multiunit franchise—because the large employer is handicapped by the costs associated with the employer mandate.

Starbucks was already offering health insurance to its employees before the ACA came along, and this benefit gave the firm a well-earned competitive advantage for employees; the ACA erodes some of that advantage. In this way, the health reform might also cause an independent shop to replace a Starbucks location, or an independent shop to open in a location where a Starbucks might have done so.

The ACA will affect the business decisions of other expanding businesses much smaller than Starbucks. Consider Yabo’s Tacos in Ohio, which has grown to three locations and about 45 employees. Yabo’s owner, Scott Bowles, has been successfully developing and managing new locations by himself. He would like to continue expanding that way—company-owned expansion—but the health reform’s employer mandate induces him to expand with franchises instead. The franchise owners may not know Yabo’s product as well as Bowles does, but employment at a Yabo’s franchise would not count against Bowles’s employee total, thereby permitting him to avoid tens of thousands of dollars in penalties or health costs.

Law-induced changes like these affect productivity—generally, in the direction of less productivity—unless the market had previously failed to have enough of the subsidized businesses and had too many of the penalized ones. Activity moves away from large business and toward small business despite the lost productivity because it is moving to avoid the ACA’s employer penalty.

Not all the labor reallocations induced by the ACA reduce productivity. The ACA’s subsidies will lead, among other things, a segment of the population to move from employer-sponsored insurance to individual coverage, and some of these people will improve productivity by doing so because it was inefficient for them to have ESI in the first place (they were sacrificing productivity in order to enjoy the long-standing tax-avoidance advantages of ESI). For example, absent the ACA, there may have been Starbucks locations and not enough independent coffee shops because Starbucks is an ESI employer, whereas the independent shops typically are not. Perhaps such instances of productivity gain should be interpreted as the purported ACA-induced surge in entrepreneurship that the law’s defenders have touted. However, this benefit has to be placed in the context of the subsidies involved: the amount of the subsidies that were suppressing entrepreneurship in the first place; and the amount of the subsidies that are being used to get people to give up their ESI. Moreover, entrepreneurship is by no means the only margin on which the ACA operates; among other things, its employer penalty encourages part of the population to give up its individual coverage and get ESI instead.

Reallocations like these are not limited to coffee shops, or even to substitution between large and small firms, because the ACA affects incentives in many other dimensions of business behavior. Table 2 shows the nationwide results. It includes productivity effects of the employer penalty and the exchange subsidies, including those effects involving enhanced productivity. The overall productivity effect is 0.9 percent in the direction of less productivity. In the long run, workers get paid according to their productivity, so 0.9 percent less productivity by itself means that wages are 0.9 percent lower. For the average worker from a low-income family (first column), that means earning $201 less per year for the same amount of work. For the average worker from a moderate- to high-income family (second column), that means earning $600 less per year for the same amount of work. When added to the employer penalty’s effect on workers’ incomes, that’s a combined annual loss of $884 for workers from low-income families and $1,110 for workers from moderate- to high-income families. As a percentage of what these workers would be earning before taxes, those are losses of 4.2 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively.

Table 2. The wage impact of the 2016 employer penalty and exchange subsidies, including inducedproductivity losses

To summarize: before the ACA, non-ESI employers (that is, employers not offering coverage to their full-time employees) operated at a competitive disadvantage and had either to pay extra for employees—an example of the “compensating difference” that Adam Smith wrote about—or be content with workers who didn’t want employer health insurance. The ACA reduces or even reverses the competitive disadvantage experienced by non-ESI employers in the market for low-skill workers. Meantime, a growing body of research is finding that productivity in economies is depressed by misallocations of resources across sectors, regions, and firms. By itself, the employer penalty will depress wages by about $600 per year, even among workers whose employer is not penalized. Productivity losses from the exchange subsidies and employer penalty together add another $400–$500 per year to the wage losses from the ACA. Overall, the ACA will reduce wages by $1,000 per year—about 4 percent of wages for workers from low-income families and nearly 2 percent of wages for workers from high-income families. None of this counts the additional effect of the employer penalty on overall employment, which will further reduce worker incomes.

Side Effects: The Economic Consequences of the Health Reform.

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Images of Life

New York is so much more than Manhattan.

There are Second Acts in American lives.

Artists need not only skill but something to say.

Those are three important lessons one can learn from photographer William Meyers’s remarkable show, “Outer Boroughs,” on display now at the Schwarzman branch of the New York Public Library. Occupying much of the wall space on the third floor of the library’s Fifth Avenue flagship branch, the photo exhibit depicts the everyday life of Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and the Bronx from 1990 through 2008. Its 90 images capture a rapidly changing city.

Photos courtesy of William Meyers
Photos courtesy of William Meyers

Many of Meyers’s pictures already feel as though they come from a different era—especially as they depict the speed with which many former slums have become fashionable enclaves. Pictures of previously dilapidated sections of Brooklyn’s Bushwick and the Bronx’s Mott Haven now seem almost quaint when set beside images of these gentrifying neighborhoods today. That sense of transformation is augmented by Meyers’s use of a 35-millimeter film camera with a Leica lens. All of his photos are silver gelatin prints on 11-by-14 inch paper, and all were developed by Chuck Kelton, an acknowledged master of the dark room. There are no digital images.

Black-and-white photography is typically characterized by high contrast and high drama. But Meyers’s work also offers moody introspection and an appreciation for quotidian moments—along with an art photographer’s interest in the delicate qualities of light and dark and the transient beauty of urban landscapes. Meyers told me that his aim was to take photos where ostensibly “nothing was happening” and to convey the significance and grace in what was before him. None of the photos are forced or staged.

The show’s inspiration, Meyers says, came from a visit he made to a B. Dalton bookstore on Fifth Avenue in 1990. Examining a heap of books of New York photographs, Meyers noted that all the pictures were of “the city”—i.e., Manhattan. The story of the other boroughs—where most of New York’s people live and where much of its industry lies—hadn’t been told. Meyers was also drawn to the city’s grand physical forms—its large cemeteries, parks, and beaches, and its subways and roadways.

One haunting image shows a colossal lot in Co-Op City, where many of Gotham’s school buses are parked at night. Devoid of human faces, the picture, Meyers says, is meant to convey the power of a bureaucracy to force children to go long distances to attend classes in the interest of arbitrary administrative aims. Meyers’s range is typified by his pictures of the Bronx: a Riverdale bluff above the Hudson in the handsome Charlotte Bronte apartment complex; enthusiastic crowds admiring mechanized Christmas displays in Pelham Gardens; aging warehouses in Castle Hill; people on the street outside the old Yankee Stadium, indifferent to the nearby sporting contest; the windows of a low-rent furniture store peddling items in heavy slip covers along Fordham Road.

Photos courtesy of William Meyers

The contrasts between tableaux in Meyers’s work is reminiscent of Edward Hopper, often evoking the frequent emptiness of city life on the one hand while capturing the variety, energy, and warmth of city inhabitants on the other. An example of the first is a picture of Greenpoint on the night before a New York City Marathon. Plainly from an earlier time, the image shows a vacant and slightly menacing scene. In the second category, however, we see a baker on Arthur Avenue, a smiling little girl holding a scrunchie in Parkchester, and the fishermen of Sheepshead Bay, displaying their catch. The city’s ethnic diversity comes through in pictures of a Bukharin singer in Forest Hills, a Romanian restaurant in Sunnyside, a meeting of a Catholic youth organization in Sunnyside, a Greek restaurant in Astoria, and a Jewish Orthodox wedding in Flushing Meadows Park.

Even when Meyers picks familiar subjects, he avoids obvious takes on them. Thus, his picture of the start of the New York City Marathon does not focus on the mass of runners but instead zeroes in on one individual, and his photo of a famous Pepsi sign along the East River emphasizes not the structure but the people around it. While some of the photos reflect Meyers’s interest in formal questions in photography and his admiration for Modernists like Henri Cartier-Bresson and Eugène Atget, the greatest number are simply studies of the city’s people and places. The exhibit is accompanied by a book, light on text or description, save for an excellent introductory essay by journalist and urban historian Francis Morrone. Otherwise, the photographs simply identify the location where they were taken and the date.

A septuagenarian who came to photography following careers as a senatorial staffer and businessman, Meyers has been a contributor to and a frequent critic for and, before that, . He notes that many exhibits of academically trained photographers are technically excellent but devoid of anything to say, as the exhibitors haven’t done much real living. That quality of real life is in abundance in his show.

Photos courtesy of William Meyers

(“Outer Boroughs” runs from March 27 to June 30 at the Stephen A. Schwarzman Branch of the New York Public Library, which is located from 40th to 42nd Street on Fifth Avenue.)

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A Gateway to the Working World

In January, President Obama announced an initiative to make two years of community college free for students who maintain good grades and stay on course to graduate. The proposal, which could extend to as many as 9 million students nationwide, reflects a growing awareness that a four-year liberal arts education, with its high price tag and uncertain job prospects, is impractical for millions of young people. The proposal also demonstrates the Obama administration’s continued coolness to another higher-education alternative: for-profit colleges, which were not included in the free-tuition plan and which many education-policy analysts believe will be hard-hit by new federal accountability measures taking effect this summer. For-profits have provided their critics with some ammunition: national data show that students at such schools default on their loans at high rates, and the institutions themselves have been scored for everything from deceptive marketing to poor quality to low graduation ratios. In a 2012 report, Senator Tom Harkin declared that “abysmal student outcomes” were “the norm” among for-profit colleges, and called the industry a “racket.”

Photograph by Harvey Wang
Photographs by Harvey Wang
Students at New York City’s Berkeley College

And yet, there is more to the for-profit story. When properly administered and regulated, these kind of schools can offer a valuable educational alternative, especially for lower-income and minority students, providing a gateway to the working world. In New York State, where for-profit enrollment has doubled over the last 30 years, a sensible regulatory regime has helped foster a number of successful schools. A solid percentage of them boast above-average student outcomes, with graduation rates outpacing any other higher-education sector. New York’s example—especially in New York City, where the for-profit sector has flourished for years—should serve as a national model.

New York’s first for-profit colleges were business institutes offering practical workplace training, including bookkeeping and office management. Some, such as Bryant & Stratton College (founded in 1854), Jamestown Business College (1886), and Utica School of Commerce (1896), still operate today. Starting in the 1970s, the New York State Board of Regents allowed these and other business schools to become for-profit degree-granting institutions. By 2010, 55,000 students were enrolled in 40 for-profit colleges across New York. This figure pales in comparison with enrollments in the City University of New York (CUNY) system (263,000 students), the State University of New York (SUNY) system (246,000), and the total enrollment of New York’s private nonprofit colleges (485,000). Some for-profits, like Wood Tobé-Coburn School in Manhattan, offer associate’s degrees only, as part of a wide range of training programs, while others provide two- and four-year degrees. New York is also home to about 500 for-profit schools that don’t offer degrees. These schools—which an estimated 200,000 students attended in 2013—generally offer certificates in niche fields such as cosmetology, culinary arts, and personal fitness training.

Students at for-profit colleges tend to be considerably older than their peers at nonprofit schools, and they’re more likely to be minorities, female, and financially independent. For the most part, they look to obtain career training, not a liberal arts education. Many are working their way through school and find online courses, which the for-profit colleges offer in abundance, appealing. Rebecca, a health administration major who transferred to Berkeley College from a four-year nonprofit private college that “wasn’t a good fit,” says that the for-profit’s mix of online and in-person courses, offered at its campuses in New York City and Westchester, as well as in New Jersey, “allows me to be flexible.” She took most of the courses for her major online. Like the University of Phoenix and some other for-profits, Berkeley also lets students enroll on a quarterly basis, so that they can finish their degrees at their own pace. “If you have the drive, you can really make it,” says Angela Harrington, Berkeley’s vice president for communications.

Student motivation may help explain why, in 2013, New York State’s two-year degree-granting for-profits graduated a larger percentage of their full-time associate’s degree students than any other higher-education sector, including private nonprofit colleges. Even when controlling for students’ high school GPAs, degree-granting for-profits’ superior record in graduating students in short-term programs holds up against CUNY and SUNY schools. Though New York’s four-year degree-granting for-profit schools have seen less dramatic success than their two-year counterparts, they, too, outperform CUNY’s four-year graduation rate, though they lag behind SUNY and private nonprofit institutions. New York State’s two-year degree-granting for-profits can also take pride in their success with African-American and Hispanic students, who graduate at higher rates than their peers attending traditional two-year colleges.

When evaluated against national averages, these schools’ numbers fare somewhat worse, though their performance remains respectable. Of New York State’s two- and four-year degree-granting for-profit colleges for which the federal government has collected full graduation and loan repayment rates, 18 percent have three-year default rates below the national average and graduation rates above the national average for students in traditional institutions. Moreover, of the 118 for-profit schools in New York—degree- and non-degree-granting alike—for which the federal government has full data, 36 percent exhibit similarly good statistics, a performance rate topping that of for-profits in other large states, such as Illinois, Texas, and California, as well as that of neighboring states such as New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

New York’s for-profit colleges seek to connect students to the world of work. LIM College, located on East 53rd Street near Fifth Avenue, offers an education in “the business of fashion.” Students there praised the school’s relentless focus on career training, which requires them to complete 130 hours of internships in both their freshman and sophomore years—first on the retail side, then on the corporate side. Like many for-profits, the school helps students obtain internships with its “industry partners”—well-known companies such as Bloomingdale’s, Versace, and the Gap. Many of these positions turn into full-time, career-path jobs after graduation. “Leaving with a full résumé is a huge perk,” says Shannon, a senior. Moreover, students say, their work experience enabled them to formulate career goals. “The internships implanted in our brains what to look for,” says Nicole, a junior—in her case, a desire to work in wholesale fashion.

Students also like for-profits’ ability to add courses relevant to today’s job market. Unlike nonprofit schools, which are typically constrained by administrative bureaucracy and tenured faculty, for-profit colleges can readily change their curricula to meet demand. One study found that for-profit colleges across the country added degree programs in popular fields such as nursing and laboratory technology at a much faster rate than did their nonprofit peers. Liz Marcuse, LIM’s president, constantly asks the industry professionals on her advisory board whether LIM is offering “current skills” and capitalizing on “emerging technologies.” LIM administrators recently added an elective in application design because “it’s such a big trend now.”

Courses have a distinctly practical bent, and many for-profits hire industry practitioners as faculty, to give students a better understanding of workplace dynamics and to connect them to particular industries. In his “Principles of Management” course at Berkeley College, Chris Christiansen, who previously worked as a manager at Empire Blue Cross / Blue Shield, draws on his experience to prepare students for the working world. The lecture I attended at Berkeley’s Midtown East campus—“The Steps in Human Resources Management”—focused on how major companies hire employees. “This will help you because in two years you’ll be looking for a job,” Christiansen told his classroom of about 40 students. “Some of the things I’m going to say you’re not going to like. But I’m going to be real with you. I’m going to tell you what today’s employer is looking for.” Christiansen outlined the technical steps of the hiring process, explaining how human-resources departments work, and described the three components of a job application: application form, résumé, and interview. He devoted most of the lecture, though, to “soft” skills, which he defined as the “cluster of personal qualities, habits, and social graces that make someone a good employee.” Potential employers, Christiansen argued, will distinguish between “the best of the best” on the basis of such skills. He urged students to stop using “filler” words such as “kinda” and “like” and stressed the importance of treating receptionists courteously, making eye contact, and dressing conservatively (dark suits, no facial hair).

Photograph by Harvey Wang
Many for-profit colleges hire industry practitioners, like former Blue Cross / Blue Shield manager Chris Christiansen, as faculty.

To drive these points home, Christiansen mock-interviewed a student volunteer and asked the class to evaluate his performance. They were unsparing, noting that the student kept his hands in his pockets when he entered the room, looked away while greeting the “interviewer,” and offered only vague answers to some questions. Christiansen, in turn, criticized the student’s self-deflating response to a question about his biggest weakness. “You never tell them anything bad!” Christiansen exclaimed. “Why say something that you don’t need to say?” Instead, he advised the interviewee, offer truthful but self-promoting responses, such as “I don’t have major experience, but I’d like to join your company to gain it,” or “I haven’t used Excel in a few months, but I’d be able to brush up on it.”

For many working professionals with experience interviewing for jobs, pointers like these may seem obvious. But it’s precisely because many lower-income students lack experience—and the professional networks that would help fill the gaps—that they choose for-profit colleges, which familiarize them with the otherwise inaccessible norms of corporate America.

Talking to many alumni of New York’s for-profit colleges gives a sense of the possibilities that these schools can open for determined students. Selina Suarez credits her career success to the education she received at Monroe College, on Jerome Avenue in the Bronx. A 2005 graduate of the school, Suarez grew up in Coney Island—“not a great neighborhood”—and dropped out of high school in 11th grade to have a baby. After languishing in an alternative school, she enrolled at Monroe when she was 19. The first in her family to attend any kind of college, Suarez appreciated Monroe’s robust support system. Staff discussed career goals with her “from day one” and helped her understand the rules of federal financial aid, which provides $4,159 in grants and $6,015 in loans to the typical federal aid–receiving New York for-profit student. Professors told her to “keep an eye on the job market” by browsing Monster.com and Bureau of Labor Statistics job projections. Seeing that information-technology professionals were in high demand, she studied HTML coding. Later, after obtaining an MBA at St. John’s University, she started a company that helps nonprofit organizations manage their own databases. She’s now an “evangelist” for Monroe, especially when she speaks to prospective students from low-income minority communities. “The population that attends for-profits wants a degree that makes them immediately marketable,” Suarez told me. “We can’t afford to just get a degree in psychology and not have a job.”

Sean O’Connor chose a for-profit college, too, but not because he grew up in a rough neighborhood. A product of the Upper West Side and St. Agnes Boys High School, O’Connor was drawn to Berkeley College for its promise of connecting students to “real-world businesses.” A self-described “average” student, O’Connor was excited by the school’s internship opportunities as well as by the chance to take courses with industry practitioners. O’Connor’s business classes taught him real-world skills, such as how to make presentations and resolve workplace conflicts. And he gained work experience through a Berkeley-arranged internship with Madison Square Garden’s building operations that led to a full-time offer. He would have accepted the position had not a Berkeley admissions counselor, who knew of his interest in basketball, steered him to an even more attractive job—working as a membership coordinator at the National Basketball Association’s retired players’ association.

Through his NBA connections, O’Connor later helped start Force Brands, a company that works with food and beverage companies like Vita Coco, Patrón Tequila, and Illy Coffee to hire talent at all levels. The six-year-old company has 38 employees. “Berkeley is so close to the real world, so close to opportunity,” says O’Connor, who graduated in 2006.

Through its two higher-education oversight bodies—the Board of Regents and the State Education Department—New York has encouraged for-profit schools without overindulging them, an approach that doubtless helps explain the schools’ generally good record. Every eight years, the Board of Regents develops New York’s Statewide Plan for Higher Education. The most recent plan praises the sector for recruiting nontraditional students and for using online education to cut costs. The plan suggests that since one of the state’s priorities is preparing students for the workforce, “the resources of institutions such as proprietary colleges and their business partners should be called upon.” Accordingly, the plan proposes clarifying requirements and investing in new technology to ease the approval process for for-profit degree programs. It also calls for a “statewide campaign” to promote institutions offering relevant career education. “On the local level, there’s been support for the for-profit sector,” observes Gbubemi Okotieuro, Berkeley College’s vice president for government relations. “We’re part of the fabric.”

But in part to guard against the spread of predatory institutions, New York also maintains strict requirements on for-profit entities wishing to establish degree-granting colleges. The state Office of College and University Administration (OCUE)’s protocol for opening a degree-granting college in any sector involves four steps: submitting a self-study, undergoing an external review, responding to an OCUE questionnaire, and receiving OCUE approval for all proposed programs. For-profit colleges, however, must take extra steps. First, they must apply for licensing as a non-degree-granting institution and exhibit “successful operation” for two years in that capacity. They can then apply to the Board of Regents for the “provisional authority” to grant degrees. They’re required to demonstrate that they can manage a school in accordance with state and federal law, that they have the financial wherewithal and experience to run degree programs, and that they have no history of “fraudulent or deceptive practices.” Likewise, non-degree-granting for-profit schools cannot receive licenses to operate from the state without disclosing their owners’ past experience running schools as well as any previous incidents of fraud and “crime involving the operation of any educational or training program.” New York attorney general Eric Schneiderman has sought to penalize for-profit colleges that promote misleading placement statistics in advertisements.

In New York, part-time students at for-profit degree-granting universities are ineligible for the Tuition Assistance Program (TAP), the state’s largest grant program, and the state provides no direct state aid to for-profit schools—reducing taxpayer liability. Students at certain degree-granting for-profits are eligible for other grant programs, however, including TAP (for full-time students) and Aid for Part-Time Study. Still, students at two-year degree-granting for-profits receive less aid than their SUNY and CUNY peers, and students at four-year degree-granting for-profits receive less aid than their peers in every other sector. OCUE director Leslie Templeman insists, though, that New York’s approach to for-profit colleges is strictly neutral. The state, she said, simply “evaluates for-profit colleges within the structure of our regulations. . . . To the extent that we have quality for-profit schools in New York State, we’re supportive of those entities.”

New York’s for-profit college administrators don’t appear to be concerned about the extra hoops through which they must jump. The requirements “were designed to prevent predators from coming into the state,” says Liz Marcuse of LIM. “They make sure fly-by-night schools can’t operate.” Monroe College executive vice president Marc Jerome praises New York’s “tight, effective” regulatory system. Of course, existing organizations tend to benefit from regulatory barriers to new entrants, but the state’s mix of encouragement and extra scrutiny has seemingly worked to produce a competitive for-profit higher-education sector.

Photograph by Harvey Wang
Courses have a distinctly practical bent.

Ample room exists, though, for improving these schools. A 2013 audit by the New York state comptroller’s office found that many of the state’s for-profit non-degree-granting career schools are unlicensed and avoid reporting requirements on employment and graduation rates. The state education department should increase scrutiny of these schools to ensure that students don’t fall prey to fraud and should continue to monitor for-profits that inflate employment statistics. The Board of Regents should also exercise its authority to sanction substandard schools and, if necessary, revoke their licenses. Policymakers could also cut off the flow of grant dollars to poorly performing institutions.

The federal government, which has tremendous leverage over for-profit schools in the form of the student-aid dollars that guarantee many of the schools’ continued existence, should also step in—and follow New York’s example of encouraging good institutions and discouraging bad ones. To that end, the Department of Education should increase available student aid at for-profit colleges with proven records of success and reduce it for low-performing schools. The Obama administration clearly prefers community colleges, as its new initiative makes clear, and it is threatening to revoke for-profit colleges’ eligibility for student aid if students exhibit low debt-to-earnings or discretionary-income ratios. But policymakers should also encourage schools that provide an innovative educational model to underserved student populations. In particular, since two-year for-profit programs have had success in New York and—unevenly—nationwide, Washington should want students to enroll in them. Rewarding high-performing for-profit colleges will encourage subpar institutions to improve or get out of the market.

Given the disparate needs of today’s college students, it’s a mistake to write off the for-profit college industry. More states—especially those like Texas and New Jersey, whose entry requirements for for-profit colleges are relatively lax—could look to New York, which has achieved solid results. Along with the federal government, New York should continue working to improve student outcomes at these schools. As New York’s record shows, for-profit colleges offer poor and minority students opportunities they’re hard-pressed to find elsewhere. That’s an outcome that policymakers at the state and national levels ought to applaud—and support.

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