45 Baby Names that Mean Music

For some parents, the definition of a name is just as important as the sound. Music is universal and names with musical definitions make great choices for your little ones. Musical names come from many countries and heritages. They have simple and creative spellings and various sound options. Let's take a look at the great name options that have musical definitions.

(1) Shira: (female) Shira is Hebrew for song. I love the sound of Shira!

(2) Apollo: (male) Meaning God of music and poetry, this Greek name is a strong choice for a baby boy.

(3) Ranit: (male or female) Hebrew for song, Ranit is a great choice for a little boy or girl.

(4) Nazim: (male) Nazim is Indian for song and has a great sound. Naz is a great nickname as well.

(5) Alahya: (female) This Indian name means musical tone or color. It's so beautiful and I love the spelling.

(6) Lirit: (female) This Hebrew name means lyrical and has a great simple sound. It's like a better Merrit.

(7) Dewon: (male) Dewon is Irish for song and fits right into the popular sound for boys names today.

(8) Melody: (female) Melody is of Greek origin and is a wonderful choice. The melody is the most important part of a song!

(9) Roni: (male or female) Hebrew for song, Roni could work on a little boy or girl.

(10) Saron: (male or female) Meaning his song in Hebrew, Saron has a wonderful sound to it.

(11) Aria: (female) This English name means gentle music. It's more of an obvious choice musically speaking, but still beautiful.

(12) Philomela: (female) This Greek name means lover of music. It is a bit of a mouthful, but fits right in with Gabriella or Isabella.

(13) Leron: (male) The Arabic meaning of Leron means the song is mine. It's a wonderful definition for your child and has a great, modern sound.

(14) Sora: (female) Sora is Native American for chirping songbird. It's a softer Zora and has such a pretty sound.

(15) Brage: (male) This is the Norwegian name for the god of music. It has a really cool sound.

(16) Rina: (female) Rina is Hebrew for joyous song. It's beautiful and is a great choice for parents who don't like nicknames.

(17) Alima: (female) Alima is an Arabic name that means learned in dance or music. It has a simple spelling and a pretty sound to it.

(18) Lark: (male or female) The American meaning of Lark is songbird. I think it could work on a boy or girl.

(19) Ranim: (male or female) Arabic for reciting in a sing song voice, Ranim is a wonderful choice for your baby boy or girl.

(20) Cadence: (female) This American name means musical beat. It another choice that is a bit more obvious, but has such a great sound and energy to it.

(21) Philyra: (female) Like Philomela, Philyra means lover of music. It is a simpler spelling, so much more relate-able for modern parents.

(22) Chantal: (female) From the French verb to sing, Chantal is a beautiful name with many alternate spelling choices.

(23) Binali: (female) With the cute nickname Nali, the Hindi name Binali is a beautiful choice. It means musical instrument.

(24) Piper: (male or female) Piper literally means a flute player. It's gender bending, so you can consider it for your baby boy or girl.

(25) Lyric: (female) Lyric is Greek for melodic word. While it is obvious, I love this name!

(26) Aika: (male or female) Aika means love song in Japanese. It has such a great definition and a very unique sound.

(27) Ruana: (female) This Hindi name means musical instrument and the nickname Ru is absolutely adorable.

(28) Musetta: (female) Musetta is French for a song. It is a really pretty name and frilly as well. I like Muse and Etta as nicknames.

(29) Bethany: (female) This is a recognizable name that means house of music in Hebrew. It's a great way to honor music and your daughter, without the name being that out there.

(30) Charmaine: (female) In Latin, Charmaine means to sing. It has a pretty sound and is definitely a bold choice.

(31) Harper: (male or female) This name literally means harp player. It's gaining popularity and can be used on a little boy or girl.

(32) Carol: (female) The French meaning of Carol is melody and song. You could also do Carolyn, Caroline, or Carollie.

(33) Daina: (female) Daina means song in Lithuania. It's a cooler spelling then Dana, and is easy to say.

(34) Jaron: (male) Meaning to shout and sing in Hebrew, Jaron is a really cool choice for your baby boy. It is much cooler than Jayden!

(35) Gita: (female) Gita is Hindi for song and has such a cute energy and sound.

(36) Kotone: (male) Kotone means harp sound in Japanese. I really like the cool sound to this name. It's very strong.

(37) Mavis: (female) This name has a very unique sound, but is super easy to spell. It is the name of a bird that means song thrush.

(38) Carmen: (female) The Latin and Spanish definition of Carmen is song. It's also the name of a beautiful opera.

(39) Riya: (female) Riya means singer in Hindi. It can also be spelled Ria, but I really love it with the "y."

(40) Zamir: (male) Hebrew for songbird, Zamir is an awesome choice for your baby boy. I love Z names, and this is a great way to take a departure from Zachary.

(41) Chyna: (female) Chyna means musical instrument. If you are a music lover who loves place names, this could be your top choice.

(42) Harmony: (female) Another obvious choice, Harmony is a great option for parents who want a recognizable musical choice.

(43) Kousan: (male) In Armenian, Kousan means singer. I really love the sound of this name, and think it should be on any music lovers list of possiblities.

(44) Zimri: (male) Zimri means my music in Hebrew. It has a really cool, unique sound and would make a great choice!

(45) Calliope: (female) Meaning beautiful voice in Greek, Calliope has such a cool sound and a great nickname in Calli.

Prodigal Soldier

Photo by Julian Vannerson

, by Jonathan Horn (Scribner, 384 pp., $28)

America’s Civil War presents a set of forever ponderable “what ifs.” What if a Union soldier hadn’t discovered plans for the Confederate invasion of Maryland in 1862? What if Stonewall Jackson hadn’t been hit by friendly fire after the Battle of Chancellorsville? What if George Meade had pursued the wounded Army of Northern Virginia in the wake of Gettysburg? The list goes on.

But perhaps the most vexing hypothetical has always been: What if Robert E. Lee had accepted Abraham Lincoln’s offer to command Union forces at the outset of the conflict? This would have likely robbed the Confederacy of its greatest military mind. It may have also robbed the South of its fleeting glories, dramatically shortened the war, and made Lee—not Ulysses S. Grant or even Abraham Lincoln—the savior of the Union. It could even have made Lee a second George Washington.

This decision and its ramifications are the basis of , Jonathan Horn’s thoughtful new life of the Confederate general. It would be wrong to call this a biography. Though Horn, a former speechwriter for President George W. Bush, assays Lee’s life from birth to death, the book is built around the premise that Lee was practically destined to become the second coming of Washington. Yet he declined, and the consequences of his refusal altered the course of the nation.

Lee had familial and professional connections to Washington. His father, Henry Lee III, better known as “Light-Horse” Harry Lee, was a dashing cavalry officer in the Continental Army. General Washington was impressed by Lee’s bravery and invited the young Virginian to join his personal staff. When Lee begged off, Washington asked Congress to give him an independent command. Like some other young officers, Lee found a mentor in Washington, who had no biological children of his own. He did, however, adopt and raise Martha Washington’s grandson, George Washington Parke Custis, as his own son. Custis’s daughter, Mary, wed Robert E. Lee. Their children, by birth and marriage, were direct descendants of America’s original first lady.

The Lees lived in Arlington House, a Potomac mansion overlooking Washington, built by Custis as a shrine to his adoptive father and a repository for his relics. Through marriage, Lee was heir to the tactile remains of Washington’s legacy; even the slaves he inherited from his father-in-law were descendants of those who had toiled at Mount Vernon. In his opening chapters, Horn carefully draws the connections between the two titular subjects and plots Lee’s rise to military distinction in the years leading up to the Civil War. The history is simply fascinating. Horn is a graceful writer, and when the occasion warrants, has a suitable flair for the dramatic. The pages blaze by.

As late as 1861, Lee maintained that secession was foolish. Given that his father had helped found the nation, and that he himself had carved out a career defending it, this was a natural position to hold. Like many of his countrymen, Lee pondered what Washington would have made of disunion. His conclusion: the great man’s “spirit would be grieved could he see the wreck of his mighty labors.” And yet, Lee would, perhaps more than any other rebel, do his part to bring that wreck about. Why?

The answer forms the heart of Horn’s book. First, for Lee, home trumped all else. Or, as the author explains, “‘Country’ had somehow mutated into ‘state.’” The idea of taking up arms against the Union was abhorrent. But if Virginia, Lee’s birthplace and home, was threatened, he had no choice but to defend her—even if it meant betraying everything he and his family had fought and stood for. Lee, like Washington but unlike his own father, was firmly in control of his emotions and desires. “[H]e ignored his own wishes,” writes Horn. Even if he considered the rebellion folly, and his role in suppressing it could bring him a form of immortality, he had no choice but to side with his home state and surrender himself to fate.

During the war, Lee couldn’t escape Washington’s shadow. Washington’s great-grandnephew, John Augustine Washington III, the heir to Mount Vernon, was an aide to Lee, and was killed while running reconnaissance with Lee’s son Fitzhugh during the Battle of Cheat Mountain in 1861. The White House plantation on Virginia’s Pamunkey River, which was sequestered and then burned by George McClellan’s men in 1862, was the home to another of Lee’s sons, Rooney. The property had originally belonged to the younger Lee’s maternal great-great grandmother, Martha Washington.

Lee did end up leading a rebellion, much like Washington, but his was a tragic and vain cause, one that brought material and human destruction to the Virginia both men loved. It also robbed the Lees of their remaining connections to Washington. After the war, the federal government transformed the grounds of Arlington House to a resting place for the Union dead and appropriated the Lee family’s treasured Washington relics.

Though his presence here is peripheral, it’s difficult to read without thinking of Lee’s father, Henry. For all his revolutionary glory, the elder Lee lived a melancholic life full of unrealized ambition for glory and riches. After wrecking his family’s finances and landing in debtor’s prison, Lee spent his last years brooding in self-imposed exile in the West Indies. Though he was not present to raise his youngest sons, he hoped that Washington’s example would serve as a surrogate father of sorts. Henry Lee had also seen the destruction and fratricide wrought by the Revolution, and had no taste for further rebellion. In the 1790s, Virginians such as Henry Lee seethed at the federal government’s economic policies. But Henry Lee knew insurrection would lead to blood. In his words, breaking from the Union was “risking too much because great evils indubitably must flow from discord & and the people must suffer greatly whatever may be the event of such an experiment.”

Decades later, fate offered Robert E. Lee a shot at the glory his father never grasped: to defend the Union he cherished and become the true heir to Washington. Instead, he joined a quixotic rebellion that tore apart the nation that his father and Washington founded, leaving over 600,000 Americans dead. “You have made the greatest mistake of your life, but I feared it would be so,” General Winfield Scott admonished Lee after he cast his lot with Virginia. Horn’s excellent book drives home the tragic magnitude of that decision.

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A Real Downside to Any Deal With Iran

Islamic State fighters in Anbar province

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu caused a stir last week when he blasted President Barack Obama’s attempt to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran. American television media covered little else for 24 hours. The prime minister and the president are still bickering about it this week on Twitter. Both have ignored a disturbing reality: any deal with Iran, good or bad, is likely to benefit ISIS.

President Obama is pursuing an agreement for understandable reasons. Far better to resolve the West’s differences with Iran diplomatically rather than violently. Prime Minister Netanyahu, likewise, is wary of the president’s plan for understandable reasons. A bad deal may be worse for Israel than no deal at all. Yet neither Obama nor Netanyahu seem to notice how an agreement, regardless of its content and efficacy, will be viewed by the Middle East’s Sunni Arabs, who are as alarmed as the Israelis are by Iranian ambitions.

The war against ISIS is being fought on two fronts in two countries, and the Middle East’s Sunni-Shia conflict rips right through the center of both. ISIS is the bloodthirsty wing of the Sunni jihadist movement, while Iran and its Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese allies make up the Shia resistance. In no way do average Sunni Arabs view ISIS as their standard bearer. Tens of thousands have lit out from its territory for squalid refugee camps abroad. But at the same time, most Sunni Arabs tremble at the rise of Iranian power and are reluctant to stand against the maniacs on their own side, especially when the U.S. and Europe appear to side with the Persians and Shia against them.

That’s not how it , but that’s how it looks. Consider this: Iranian Revolutionary Guard general Qasem Soleimani is personally leading the Iraqi operation to wrest control of the city of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, from ISIS. When Iraq’s Sunnis see Shia militias and Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops gunning for their territory, they feel a looming threat to their very existence. And at the same time, the West is bombing ISIS positions in both Syria and Iraq, while Washington is at least nominally allied to Baghdad and trying to cut a deal with Tehran. The Sunnis see the world’s only superpower teaming up with their enemies and gearing up to smash them to pieces.

It looks little better from a Sunni’s perspective in Syria. The U.S. hardly supports the malignant Assad, but all of Washington’s air strikes have landed on Sunni jihadist targets even after President Obama accused Damascus of deploying chemical weapons in civilian population centers. Like the government in Baghdad, the House of Assad is firmly in the Iranian camp. The state, along with the ruling family, is heavily packed with members of the Alawite minority, adherents of a heterodox religion that fuses Shia Islam, Christianity, and Gnosticism.

The Assads have had their boots on the necks of Syria’s Sunni majority since 1971, when the late Hafez al-Assad seized power, and they’ve been the Arab world’s staunchest Iranian allies ever since. Assad is also, along with Iran’s clerical regime, a patron and armorer of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, by far the deadliest Shia terrorist organization in the world and one which is actively and effectively fighting against Syria’s armed Sunni opposition on behalf of its masters. In light of all that, ISIS has an easier time presenting itself as the defender of the region’s Sunni Arab majority against an axis of Persian-Shia-Alawite perfidy.

Meanwhile, Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority has been out of the saddle since the United States removed Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the Shia majority naturally came to power in elections. Baghdad’s government is less oppressive than the Assad regime, to be sure, but it’s backed by a demographic majority that makes the Sunnis—only a rough 20 percent of the country—feel acutely and permanently endangered.

These people are hardly ISIS’s natural constituency. They fought and died to evict ISIS from their lands in the late 2000s when it still went by the name al Qaeda in Iraq. The only reason ISIS managed to conquer huge swaths of the country last summer is because the previous prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, governed like an Iranian-backed Shia warlord. The Sunni tribes fear and loathe ISIS, but they fear and loathe the Iranian regime and Iraq’s Shia-dominated government, too—maybe more. Perhaps better, they think, to be lorded over by “their own” than face pitiless persecution at the hands of “the other.”

Both sides behave viciously—though the ISIS side wins in the atrocity comptetion. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the organization’s founding father under its previous name, described the Shia as “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom.” A huge percentage of Iraq’s Sunnis have viewed the Shia this way for more than a thousand years.

ISIS’s rhetoric is exterminationist. Its serial massacres of Shias, Christians, Yezidis, and Alawites stink of genocide. The West shouldn’t kid itself into believing that what happens in Syria and Iraq will stay in Syria and Iraq. ISIS truly believes it’s on a God-sanctioned mission to challenge and defeat European powers and bring about the apocalypse. “We will conquer your Rome,” it boasts in its glossy online magazine, , “break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the Permission of Allah, the Exalted. This is His promise to us.”

It’s never going to happen, but ISIS and its supporters have already proved they’re willing and able to carry out deadly strikes in Europe. The recent killings at the office in Paris and the attack on a Jewish museum in Belgium last year are likely but prologues. And the odds that ISIS will be undermined internally by Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis while they’re facing what appears to be a Western-backed enemy alliance in Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad are virtually zilch.

Does this mean the West shouldn’t cut even a theoretically good deal with Iran to prevent the regime from building nuclear weapons? I have no idea. But I’d like to know if anyone in Washington or Jerusalem is at least asking the question.

City JournalWorld AffairsThe Road to Fatima GateTower of the Sun.

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Rude? Moi?

Photo by Julia Janßen

On returning to France after spending almost a decade in Turkey (and not long before the terrorist attacks of January), I discovered that the French—Parisians, in particular—have become surprisingly polite. I now find myself living in a city in which the following things happen. A kindly Parisienne not only notices that I am mildly lost, but offers to help and insists upon walking with me, well out of her way, to be sure that I am on the right path. A Darty washing machine arrives on my doorstep, exactly on time, presented by deliverymen who seem to live for the privilege of service; without so much as a grumble, they whisk away my old and broken one, too, even though I live on the fourth floor of a building with no elevator. In leaving, they express gratitude with the words, “It is thanks to you, Madame, that we work, which we so much appreciate.” Granted, the waiter at my local café knows me, but usually someone so solicitous of my well-being, so radiantly affable, charges a hundred bucks an hour and proposes to talk about my childhood, not sell me a cup of coffee every now and again.

So why are the French still widely judged to be rude? I suspect that a well-known cognitive phenomenon is at work: people see what they expect to see. The French long had a reputation for rudeness, and tourists see rudeness even when it’s not there. Since tourists expect it, though, they dish it out first—which sometimes prompts a like reaction, and not just in France. So now, the French, when they rude, may often be to rudeness. Paris attracts tourists, not travelers. A traveler goes to see what is there; the tourist comes to see what he wants. Perhaps tourists want to be treated rudely by Parisians, for it would not feel like a visit to Paris otherwise.

More than most languages, one should add, French conveys civility and respect by means of verbiage that, to the American ear, seems preposterous. A failure to use the right flowery greeting in a French restaurant is felt, more or less, as a failure to smile and say “please” would be in an American one. Worse, really. Without it, you may as well walk into that restaurant with a lash in hand and address your waiter as Gunga Din. Given that tourists don’t usually understand this, the change in the way Parisians tend now to respond (very nicely) is astonishing.

The perception of rudeness may also be the result of linguistic misunderstanding. The nasalization of French consonants is distinctive; it often obscures the quality of French vowels, causing confusion to nonnative speakers. French speakers find equally baffling the vowels pronounced by foreigners. Those vowels are the difference between ship and sheep, as the ESL teachers would explain, or between sheet and Shinola, as they say in less professional contexts. French lacks clear stress in its syllables; foreigners tend to give French syllables unwarranted stress, with the consequence that French speakers really can’t understand them. They are not pretending to misunderstand out of snobbery. They just don’t understand.

But the French are nicer these days, even when they can’t figure out what the visitor from Chicago is saying. Why the change? For one thing, like everyone, the French have become better traveled and more aware of other cultures. For another, a concerted government campaign has taught the French that when tourists do strange things, it’s not because they are rude; it’s only because they are strange. The campaign also emphasizes that locals should not respond in ways that might in turn seem rude, particularly because tourists bring in lots of money—on which France relies. For yet another, the younger generation has received better education in English and is more confident speaking it. Yet no matter how demonstrably Parisian manners have improved, tourists still see what they expect to see and what they’ve read about: rudeness. And they keep complaining about it—which is, I think, terribly unfair.

So if you visit and find the French to be rude, I gently submit to you that the problem may not be the French, but something else—though, of course, it would be entirely rude to suggest that it might, in fact, be you.

City Journal There Is No Alternative: Why Margaret Thatcher Matters.

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The Wrong “America Works”

Kevin Spacey as President Frank Underwood in Netflix’s

Most Hollywood fictions can be relied upon to rewrite conservative truth into left-wing fantasy. In real life, the staunch Cold Warrior president John F. Kennedy is assassinated by a Communist for the sake of Communism. At the movies, Oliver Stone turns Kennedy into a peacenik killed by a vast right-wing conspiracy. In real life, a married Democratic president faces credible charges of philandering and mistreatment of women. Onscreen, Michael Douglas magically transforms him into an unmarried man of integrity excoriated by the puritanical right for falling deeply in love with an accomplished woman his own age. In real life, leftists in the news media attempt to discredit a Republican president by creating a nonsensical scandal out of the Valerie Plame kerfuffle. At the multiplex, the scandal becomes deadly real and Vice President Dick Cheney (who had nothing to do with any of it) is somehow behind it all.

We’ve all become so accustomed to this leftward rejiggering of history that watching Netflix’s TV series can be a weird and confusing experience. On the one hand, by dramatizing the rise of a corrupt, soulless Democratic pol willing to break any law, betray any principle, and literally throw his opponents under trains to acquire power—and by showing a Republican opposition too bumbling and cowardly to oppose his ruthless machinations—the series hews so close to the facts that it can hardly be called fiction at all. But when it comes to portraying the actual nuts and bolts of day-to-day policy making, the show sometimes seems to take place in an unidentifiable political Wonderland.

In the first season, House majority whip Frank Underwood—the soulless Democrat in question, played by the wonderful Kevin Spacey—seeks serious entitlement reform in spite of opposition from Republicans. He also stands up to the teachers’ unions in hopes of improving education. One can be forgiven for wondering on which planet this is taking place.

Then, in the present third season, Underwood, now risen to the White House, seeks to reform Social Security and other entitlement programs that are “sucking this country dry,” in order to fund a program that will get people off the welfare rolls and put them to work. When I heard those ideas come out of the mouth of a Democrat, I thought for a moment I had accidentally switched to the SyFy network.

But to add to the confusion, the name of Underwood’s $500 billion job proposal is America Works. Only it’s not at all like the America Works, which actually works, but much more like Obamanomics, which hardly works at all.

Underwood’s America Works—as Jon Hartley notes in —looks a lot like Obama’s $787 billion America Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which was supposed to create 7 million new jobs and bring the unemployment rate down below 7 percent by 2010. None of that happened. In fact, the drop in the unemployment rate didn’t really get started until Republicans finally found the guts to put an end to unemployment benefits in 2013. This they managed to do despite the fact that Democrats like Obama and Nancy Pelosi kept claiming that unemployment insurance was actually creating jobs itself. By that logic we would have reached full employment once everyone was out of work!

The real-life America Works, however, was formed in 1984 as a response to the abject failure of government attempts to end poverty. In an Autumn 2012 piece, America Works founder Peter Cove described how his experience as “a foot soldier in America’s War on Poverty,” led him to create the initiative:

We know for certain that income transfers, the preferred tactic of generations of liberals, have utterly failed to end poverty . . . . I learned that if we helped welfare clients get jobs, even entry-level jobs, they would then attend to their other needs. By contrast, if the government gave them money and other benefits, they were likely to remain dependent.
The reasons should have been obvious all along. Work maximizes a person’s capacity to achieve economic self-reliance. Work socializes people and instills a sense of personal responsibility in them. Work connects behavior and consequences. And it permits people, especially men, to obtain the admiration and respect of their spouses and children by supporting them.

America Works set itself up as a job agency for state and local welfare agencies. It took payment only when it placed clients in jobs, and the clients held those jobs for at least four months. It claims to have taken more than 300,000 people off the welfare rolls and to have inspired the 1996 Welfare Reform Act. And still, Cove reports, the initiative is viewed with suspicion by those people whose ideology—and power—requires dependency and the big government that encourages it.

I suppose it’s realistic enough that the soulless Democrat Underwood would ignore a private America Works that works in order to propose a government America Works that doesn’t work. But it would have been nice if he hadn’t further muddied the show’s muddy politics by putting a good name to bad policy.

City JournalWerewolf Cop.

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Taking None of It Back

Photo by NYC Mayor’s Office

Severe winter weather has put a chill on the simmering battle between New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and the NYPD. But if the mayor’s remarks this week on Comedy Central’s are any indication, get ready for a spring offensive.

Appearing loose and ready to laugh before a friendly audience, the mayor fielded a videotaped question from an African-American New Yorker who wanted to know, “How are you addressing the problems between blacks and the police?” Host Larry Wilmore followed up by noting that de Blasio had been criticized for his claim to have “trained” his biracial son, Dante, to be wary of cops. “What is your relationship right now with the police,” Wilmore asked. “How’s that beef?”

A better opportunity couldn’t have presented itself for de Blasio to undo the damage caused by his claims that “centuries of racism” were behind the death of Eric Garner, the African-American man who died last year while resisting arrest. According to the , Garner had been arrested more than 30 times for assault, resisting arrest, and grand larceny, among other charges. Nevertheless, after a Staten Island grand jury declined to indict the cops involved, de Blasio used a press conference appearance to heap praise on Garner, calling him “a father, a husband, a son—a good man.” The mayor claimed that he and his wife worried “every night” that their son would be targeted by cops. “Is my child safe?,” he said. “Are [kids like Dante] safe from the very people they want to have faith in as their protectors?”

The remarks inflamed cops, who saw them as a both a racial smear and a betrayal of the good men and women of the NYPD responsible for bringing crime in the once “ungovernable” city to historic lows. When, a week after that press conference, Ismaaiyl Brinsley murdered NYPD officers Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos as they sat in their parked police cruiser, the blowback against de Blasio was swift. Some said he had allowed an atmosphere to develop that encouraged protesters to attack police officers. Former NYPD commissioner Ray Kelly accused de Blasio of having won office on an “anti-cop campaign.” Uniformed police turned their backs on the mayor at the hospital where the murdered officers’ bodies were taken and again, weeks later, at their respective funerals.

Rank-and-file cops—and many in the press—demanded an apology. A grim-faced de Blasio refused, but pledged to repair the relationship. “I think the people of this city want us all to move forward,” he said in January. “I think they want us to be mature adults and sit down and resolve differences and move forward and my door is open.”

Have the cops forgiven de Blasio for his role in last year’s unpleasantness? If so, it hasn’t been reported on. But if the tenor of Monday’s television appearance is any indication, de Blasio is confident that he’s weathered the storm. Why else would he blithely repeat his claim that Dante needs to be careful around cops? He could have sloughed off Wilmore’s question with a politician’s non-response. “Things are better now than they were, Larry,” he could have said. “We’re still not there yet, and I bear some of the responsibility for that, but I’m still committed to repairing the relationship.”

Instead, de Blasio opted to double-down on his “fundamental belief” that the NYPD arrests young black kids like Dante not because African-Americans commit the majority of crimes in New York City, but because of police racism.

Mayor de Blasio still owes the NYPD an apology. If it’s not forthcoming, the least he could do is avoid opening old wounds. Unless, of course, the mayor—who the says is “becoming a fixture on the television landscape”—sees some national political advantage in reviving his war with the cops. Stay tuned. We’re bound to find out.

City Journal

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Why Progressives Mislead

LM OTERO/AP PHOTO
A Democratic Congress and president pushed through Obamacare, a law unpopular with the majority of Americans.

Barack Obama’s supporters and detractors don’t agree on much, but as the president enters his final two years in office, they have voiced a common complaint: the president lacks competence. They cite multiple management breakdowns, such as the disastrous rollout of the Obamacare health-insurance website, which have eroded public support; his lack of engagement with Congress, which has impeded his legislative agenda; and his chronic inability to address serious problems before they become full-blown crises, undermining Americans’ confidence in his leadership.

There is no doubt considerable truth to these charges. But Obama’s fundamental problems stem less from incompetence than from his philosophy of governance. In his first presidential campaign, Obama took pains to distinguish his approach from the incrementalism of Bill Clinton and modeled himself instead on the transformational leadership of Franklin Roosevelt and of Ronald Reagan. During the race, and increasingly after the election, it became clear that Obama embraced a theory of dramatic political change—that of progressivism, which dates its American origins to an early-twentieth-century era of social and political reform. And he has adhered to it, despite some of the worst midterm election defeats faced by any two-term president.

Progressivism’s vision of the role of the state conflicts with the system of government envisioned by America’s Founders. The Founders wanted citizens to be free to pursue their affairs individually and in voluntary association; the powers of the federal state were to be tightly constrained. In contrast, the greatest political theorist of American progressivism, Herbert Croly, said that the nation’s “democracy should be focused on an equal sharing of wealth and responsibilities”—an enterprise that demands a larger and more intrusive federal state to enforce. Obama spoke from this tradition on the campaign trail in 2008—most famously, when he told Joe the Plumber that it was “good to spread the wealth around.”

But Obama and his supporters face a more challenging political landscape than did their progressive forebears. In the early twentieth century, progressives introduced new entitlements against the backdrop of low federal spending and a much smaller federal government. At the beginning of the Progressive Era, federal government spending represented only about 4 percent of GDP; it reached 11 percent when FDR introduced Social Security. (Even that figure was artificially high because the Depression had dramatically reduced GDP.) And progressivism in its early years enjoyed support among the legions of poor, who had little to lose from the rearrangement of rights by government programs.

Today, the federal government spends more than five times as much, as a percentage of GDP, than it did at the beginning of the last century, and twice as much as when Social Security was introduced. That amount will continue to grow, driven by the rising cost of entitlements for an aging population. The future consequences of past decisions thus constrain the present capacity of the state, even as progressivism’s reach becomes more ambitious: reorganizing health care, as the Obama administration has begun to do with the 2010 passage of the Affordable Care Act, better known as Obamacare, touches everyone’s life in ways that, say, the regulation of railroads did not. Such massive programs are more likely to be complex and to generate popular resistance, as Obamacare has done.

On top of these structural difficulties, the progressive coalition has also become harder to maintain. Over the course of the twentieth century, free-market capitalism created unprecedented mass affluence. The average income of Americans grew by more than four times in the last century, making the United States the wealthiest nation of any substantial size. Citizens now have more to lose from interventions in the free market, because they are better off. It’s hard to imagine that a progressive party could maintain control of both the House and Senate for 20 consecutive years and the House for 40 years, as did the Democrats earlier in the twentieth century.

Faced with these constraints, today’s progressives must resort to more misleading and sometimes coercive measures, as they seek to bring about equality through collective responsibility; they must rally support by looking beyond economics, to cultural and social identifications, in a bid to maintain the support of voters with little need for government intervention. They also want to limit the voices of citizens at election time, and thereby magnify the influence of the press and academia, which lean sharply in the progressive direction.

Nothing shows the progressive dependence on subterfuge more starkly than Obamacare, which, by imposing a personal mandate to buy insurance in an effort to bring health care to all, will restructure one-sixth of the American economy. Single-payer government health insurance has been a dream on the left for decades, but it was never a politically realistic option. This was true even while Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, as they did during the first two years of Obama’s first term. The American public wouldn’t tolerate the level of government funding that a single-payer system would require, so the best that the administration could do was to impose a regulatory structure, while accepting a private-insurance model. In crafting the Affordable Care Act, the administration intentionally avoided describing the individual mandate as a tax—a tacit admission that doing so could have sunk the bill. After the bill became law, however, the administration turned around and argued before the Supreme Court that the mandate , in fact, a tax. The Court upheld the mandate as an exercise of an enumerated government power to levy taxes. Even then, the administration concealed Obamacare’s taxes on the wealthy, which were not added to the income-tax tables. The recently publicized comments of MIT professor Jonathan Gruber about the deception involved in promoting the Affordable Care Act demonstrate that such chicanery has become intrinsic to modern progressivism.

American affluence also proved a political obstacle for the law’s drafters. Most Americans already had health insurance and a doctor with whom they felt comfortable. To secure support for the ACA, therefore, Obama had to promise repeatedly that those happy with their current health plans (and doctors) could keep them. But ACA requirements resulted in the cancellation of many insurance plans, causing patients to lose access to their doctors. This proved the most damaging blow to Obama’s credibility.

Some have labeled the president’s economy with the truth a personal failing, but it’s more like a professional necessity. Modern progressivism’s business model requires obscuring the reality that new programs have winners and losers—and the losers are spread throughout the general population, not confined to members of the so-called 1 percent. As the Affordable Care Act goes fully into effect, the losers will become more visible. If people had known the truth about Obamacare in 2010, the bill would almost certainly have been defeated. If they had known it in 2012, Obama would likely have lost his reelection bid.

The architects of Obamacare needed these deceptions, in part, because more people are becoming aware of the financial burden of unfunded liabilities. As a result, it is not as easy to slough off costs on future generations. Obamacare’s ill-fated CLASS (Community Living Assistance Services and Supports) provision, a long-term-care insurance program for the elderly, is a case in point. A voluntary program, CLASS was required by law to be financially self-sustaining, meaning that it would need large numbers of young and healthy people to sign up for it—a dubious prospect. The revenues expected in CLASS’s first years made Obamacare seem more fiscally responsible in the short term than it really was, though the Medicare actuary warned that this was a mirage. “Thirty-six years of actuarial experience,” he wrote in an internal e-mail, “lead me to believe that this program would collapse in short order and require significant federal subsidies to continue.” Less than two years later, HHS secretary Kathleen Sebelius concluded that the program could not be self-sustaining and terminated it.

Even before Obamacare’s false promises were revealed, the law was not popular with middle-class voters, who felt that Obama was less interested in restarting the stagnant economy than in creating a new welfare program. Riding a wave of dissatisfaction with the new law, Republicans took control of the House of Representatives in 2010. Four years later, with the ACA even more disliked, the Republicans took the Senate, too. Since Obamacare never had bipartisan support, the Democrats would have been hard-pressed to pass amendments to improve it under the best circumstances; their legislative losses made the question academic. This difficulty underscores a key problem with central planning: the world is unpredictable. Just as no military plan survives contact with the enemy, no program of government benefits, and certainly not one as ambitious as Obamacare, can anticipate the changing circumstances in which it will operate.

Struggling with problems of implementation and public resistance, the administration has held off enforcing inconvenient parts of the law, such as the one requiring businesses to offer health-care insurance to their employees by 2013. That provision was delayed by one year. The law also required uninsured individuals to purchase health plans, but the administration exempted those who would “face hardship.” Since following the law’s required timeline would have had adverse political consequences, the administration claimed the authority to delay and amend these provisions. But the law’s statutory deadlines were clear.

The Supreme Court will soon determine the legality of yet another Obama administrative action that appears to contradict the plain language of the Affordable Care Act. The statute provides taxpayer subsidies for insurance policies bought on “exchanges established by the states.” But almost half the states have declined to establish such exchanges. When states don’t set up exchanges, the ACA then requires the federal government to do so but provides no parallel authorization for subsidies. Nevertheless, the Treasury Department has adopted regulations offering such subsidies, arguing that they advance the overall purpose of the ACA. Authorizing subsidies for federal exchanges is vital to the future of Obamacare, particularly because sign-up numbers have been disappointing. Should the Supreme Court rule that the administration lacks this authority, though, any attempt to provide authority through legislation will lead to wholesale revision of Obamacare in the Republican Congress.

Progressivism has long valued executive discretion in domestic affairs because presidents need to make fewer compromises than do legislatures. Not surprisingly, Obama-era progressives argue for maximizing the scope of that discretion. The Democratic Senate’s decision to do away with the filibuster on judicial nominations, for instance, was principally designed to eliminate any roadblocks to confirming Obama’s nominees to the District of Columbia Circuit. That court oversees the exercise of administrative discretion in many important government programs—including Obamacare.

But today’s progressivism needs more than wide-ranging discretion to adapt its laws to new circumstances when its coalition no longer controls Congress. The examples above suggest that President Obama is exercising unilateral power to decline to enforce laws or even to rewrite them. Such power exceeds the traditional norms of prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, it comes perilously close to the “dispensing power” of the Stuart monarchs, who claimed the authority to disregard laws. The British rejected that power during the Glorious Revolution, and the Founders rejected it, too, by inserting language into the American Constitution requiring that the president “take Care that the law be faithfully executed.”

Progressives also want to transform the rights provisions of the Constitution to improve their chances of political success. The president was so concerned about the Supreme Court’s protection of free speech in political campaigns that he attacked its campaign-finance decision, which abolished restrictions on independent political expenditures by nonprofit groups. In a State of the Union address, Obama claimed that the ruling “reversed a century of law to open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign companies—to spend without limitation.” Obama’s comment about foreign corporations was no truer than his claims about the Affordable Care Act. It was instead an attempt to use xenophobia in support of the suppression of political speech. And the principal beneficiaries of , in fact, aren’t for-profit corporations, which don’t want to offend their consumers by taking political positions, but nonprofit corporations that allow citizens to band together to deliver political messages for various causes.

The freedom of citizens to pay for political messages poses a threat to progressives because it endangers the control over political and social discourse that the Left otherwise enjoys. The media lean overwhelmingly Democratic, with some studies estimating the imbalance between Democrats and Republicans at more than four to one. Academia is even more lopsidedly left-wing. In the Ivy League, which remains the most powerful educational megaphone for social ideas, Obama attracted 20 times as many contributors as Mitt Romney. This ideological imbalance provides progressivism with one of its most powerful weapons. And here the attack on becomes especially practical: restricting independent campaign expenditures will allow the press and the academic world to control the agenda, as they already do for periods between elections.

It’s worth noting in this light that the single constitutional amendment that Obama has endorsed in office is one overruling . Last year, Senate Democrats brought to the floor an even broader amendment that would have permitted Congress to regulate both campaign expenditures and contributions. The amendment would have exempted the press from regulation, suggesting that the political objective is indeed agenda control.

Obama’s exercise of executive discretion extends further still. Most recently, in a move decried by conservative constitutionalists, he signed an executive order deferring the deportation of some 4 million illegal immigrants, allowing them to work legally in the United States. While his stroke of the pen cannot grant citizenship, it can create a new political reality, making it harder to resist the main political prize for progressives: guaranteeing a path to voting citizenship. These and other moves represent an attempt to create a new political order in which progressivism is more likely to thrive.

This goal also explains why the new progressivism must enlarge its agenda to include social issues, engaging in the wars of culture as well as class. While the old progressivism focused almost exclusively on economics, the new progressivism seeks a panoply of new entitlements, from on-demand contraception to same-sex marriage. Today’s progressive enthusiasm for creating new constitutional rights out of the latest social cause expands progressivism’s appeal to more affluent, secular voters, for whom bending the arc of history gives meaning to life. To succeed, then, modern progressivism must reconstitute the nature of politics, not merely change the content of policies.

In response to the progressive agenda, conservatives and libertarians must also focus on the structure of politics. Where the new progressivism would burst the bounds of law to pursue its goals, today’s conservatives must strengthen the rule of law. For instance, the response to modern progressivism’s desire for a dispensing power should be statutory requirements that expressly forbid the president from modifying laws with which he disagrees, together with statutes that widen the ability of citizens to challenge such executive illegality. Moreover, the new Republican Congress should enact amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act that require congressional approval for major exercises of executive discretion. The Right became more enamored of executive discretion when Republicans seemed to have a lock on the presidency. But for reasons of both principle and tactical necessity, conservatives should re-embrace a notion of limited government based in congressional, not presidential, power.

Countering the progressive drive to reduce the speech rights of those outside the symbolic class, conservatives should emphasize the principle of equality before the law. No class should be given particular privileges to speak about politics. The answer to complaints about the undue influence of campaign money at election time can be found in the principle of neutrality. Congress should commit itself to operate by evenhanded rules of appropriate generality and thus ban earmarks, targeted regulatory relief, and other favors often used to reward political support.

Devotion to the rule of law can also contain corrosive culture wars. By decentralizing decision making and diffusing debate in this context, federalism lowers the temperature of national politics and allows the national government to focus on defense and other issues to which it is uniquely suited. And decreasing the payoff to victory in the culture wars lessens progressives’ motivation to use social appeals to rally a coalition that might otherwise fracture.

From its inception, progressivism has posed a threat to constitutional government. It has sought to replace limited and decentralized governance with dynamic, centralized authority in order to force some arrangement of equality on the nation. Because the world has a way of upsetting abstract designs, progressivism depends on empowering administrators to impose its frameworks while disempowering citizens from resisting these coercions. The Obama administration’s push for unilateral presidential authority to disregard the law is thus the logical extension of the progressive program. Opposition to this program requires nothing less than a rededication to our Founding ideals: our nation must be governed by the rule of law, not the rule of an elected monarch or of a legally privileged aristocracy.

Accelerating Democracy.

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